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Protecting Cultural Heritage By Recourse to
International Environmental Law:
Chinese Stances on Faultless State Liability
Riccardo Vecellio Segate*
Abstract
Several international policy documents define the environment as
made of “natural heritage” and “cultural heritage” together, along the lines
of concepts such as “biosphere” or “ecosystem” which have been
introduced relatively recently to define the complexity of humanenvironment interactions. Nevertheless, distinguishing natural heritage
from the cultural one helps analyse situations where damage inflicted to the

* Riccardo Vecellio Segate is the Talent Program PhD Candidate in International
Law at the Faculty of Law of the University of Macau, and an upcoming Visiting Student
Researcher at the University of California, Berkeley. He was previously an Exchange
Scholar at Tsinghua Law School in Beijing, and was selected as a Visiting Fellow at the
Law & Technology Centre at the University of Hong Kong. He completed, inter alia, a
Master of Laws in Public International Law from Utrecht University, a Postgraduate
Diploma in European and Global Governance from the University of Bristol, and three
Diplomas in European Affairs, Development Cooperation, and Humanitarian Intervention
from ISPI in Milan. He also studied Music at the University of Leeds, and was one of the
last students of the pianist Aldo Ciccolini in Paris. Mr Vecellio Segate served the Utrecht
Journal of International and European Law as its Executive Editor and Secretary in 20172019, and worked extensively in policy and legal affairs for both private firms and public
institutions all across Europe, North America, and Asia. He is also the case-law reporter for
Oxford University Press’ International Law in Domestic Courts Reports, for the jurisdiction
of Hong Kong SAR. His scientific commitment has gained international recognition, e.g.,
in November 2019 with the Young Scholar Prize at the Algorithms Conference organised
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former negatively impacts the latter. In fact, cultural heritage sits under
siege worldwide due to polluting activities and environmental degradation,
which are causing irreparable damage to—or even the disappearance of—
valuable expressions of civilisations’ legacy.
Most damages are
transboundary, thereby calling into question bilateral forms of States’
liability; others involve a globalised dimension of climate change,
addressed through “trusteeships” whereby the international community
establishes centralised compliance schemes which are built on incentives
and sanctions while do not necessarily provide for clear-cut liabilities. Yet,
this uncertainty on the liability schemes to be applied to different sources
of environmental damage to cultural heritage in peacetime remains
underexplored in legal scholarship, which rather tends to focus on the
protection of cultural heritage in armed conflicts, on environmental
damages exclusively considering the environment’s natural elements, on
state liability within domestic jurisdictions only, or on liability as a
corollary of state responsibility. Two categories of events are to be
assessed: those where a home damage to the environment results in damage
to cultural heritage abroad, and those where the damage to both occurs
directly extraterritorially; these both may occur due to state initiatives, or
through malpractices of corporations which are neither owned nor
controlled by the State. Strict, absolute, or “soft” liabilities are invoked by
private parties when their property is violated, or by States when their
heritage as a collective good is damaged, but might also involve the
international community as a whole when such cultural expressions are
deemed of public interest and conceptualised as “global commons.” When
it comes to damages of this sort, it is unlikely that States purposively caused
them or even deliberately refrained from preventing them; what is more,
these damages often occur as a result of concurrent actions by multiple
countries over extensive periods of time. Consequently, the legal analysis
on liabilities warrants to be framed under a broader cosmopolitan solidarity
and burden-sharing perspective, whereby States voluntarily uphold the
convenience of selected forms of international liability, in order to protect
cultural heritage and contain one of the most perilous side-effects of
deregulated anthropisation. To this end, China’s metamorphosis from lawrecipient to law-maker status on the international plane is worth focusing
on. By scrutinising Beijing’s approach to (international) environmental
law during the “Western humiliation” period, the WW2 aftermath, the
“Cultural Revolution”, and the transition to world power status under the
label of “socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics,” it is
possible to draw inferences on what liability schemes for cultural heritage
protection are deemed desirable in Chinese politics and discourses. An
investigation of the values underpinning China’s policies over the last
decades facilitates the tracing of the normative spillovers from
environmental law to cultural heritage law (and vice versa), as well as the
154
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debunking of implementation asymmetries between domestic and
international preferences.
I. Introduction
Compared to the environmental catastrophes brought about by climate
change and to the health upheavals owing to pollution, environmentally
dependent damages to cultural heritage may seem prima facie relatively
negligible. And yet, cultural heritage not only matters for cementing
feelings of belonging, but it truly represents the sense of continuity across
generations in both peacetime and wartime;1 it embodies the ultimate
meaning of sustainable development,2 in that it contributes to the very
existence of identity-aware societies that stand able to value their past in
order to secure their future.3 Cultural heritage is a living idea blending
nature and humans, as much as a contribution to sustainable peace efforts;4
despite its “touristicisation” the World Heritage List (“WHL”) is routinely
blamed for, cultural heritage seems to resist globalisation, or at least to
expose the latter’s inherent contradictions without being vanquished by it.
Rightly or wrongly, cultural heritage has been offered even higher
protection than civilians in several armed conflicts all throughout the XX
century; a well-known example is that of the Second World War (“WW2”),
when e.g., Paris, Milan,5 as well as the literary treasures of the
Montecassino Abbey were spared thanks to deliberate choices by Allied
and Nazi-Fascist military commanders alike. Nowadays, monuments et
similia are not threatened by regular armed conflicts, but by irregular forces
(paramilitaries, rebels, terrorist, mercenaries, …) and “new” asymmetrical
1. Roger Michael O’Keefe, Cultural Heritage and International Criminal Law,
SÉBASTIEN JODOIN & MARIE-CLAIRE CORDONIER SEGGER, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND TREATY IMPLEMENTATION, 120–150 (2013).
2. Lisa Rogers, Intangible Cultural Heritage and International Environmental Law:
The Cultural Dimensions of Environmental Protection, 29(3) HIST. ENV’T 30, 34–35 (2017)
3. See, e.g., Hangzhou International Congress China - Culture: Key to Sustainable
Development, The Hangzhou Declaration: Placing Culture at the Heart of Sustainable
Development Policies, CLT-2013/WS/14 (May 17, 2013).
4. See generally Iwona Szmelter, New Values of Cultural Heritage and the Need for
a New Paradigm Regarding its Care, Conservation: Cultures and Connections (2013),
https://perma.cc/7X58-Q62E.
5. “Sir Charles Portal, Royal Air Force’s Commander-in-Chief, severely admonished
the colonel of the fighter bombers after their incursion over Milan on 24 October 1942,
during which the Cathedral risked to be razed to the ground, as he had heavily and
unnecessarily put into question the loyalty of any military officer who cares about artistic
treasures, as well as RAF’s reputation before the civilized world of today and those next-tocome,” Fernanda Mottura, La circolazione delle opere d’arte nel diritto dell’Unione Europea
e i limiti posti dall’ordinamento italiano 30 (2016) (unpublished dissertation, LUISS)
(translated by author).
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warfare techniques; in an even more widespread fashion, they are at risk
because of climate change, pollution6 and environmental degradation,7
which are exactly the factors this paper is premised to investigate in greater
detail. Here, the environment is not simply made reference to as a good to
be protected in times of conflict8 or its aftermath, but as a legal, policy and
conceptual framework of use when it comes to protecting cultural heritage
in both peacetime and wartime, in a way that allows environmental
protection to fill the gaps in cultural heritage protection, and vice versa.
Human life is inherited together with a “code” that generations secretly pass
onto the upcoming ones, made of interdependence and contextuality
between culture and nature.9 Cultural legacies and symbols in their
environmental contexts are what remains (or should remain) when time
goes by,10 that is, what allows different generations of the same nation11 to
recognise each other as part of the same unwritten contract built on shared
meta-narratives bearing legal significance.12 The same paradigm applies to
the global society when it comes to heritage of universal value, which is
why “domestic relaxed rules protecting the cultural or natural heritage
6. See generally JOHN WATT ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF AIR POLLUTION ON CULTURAL
HERITAGE (2009). For an exemplification in China, see Lynn G. Salmon, Airborne
Pollutants in the Buddhist Cave Temples at the Yungang Grottoes, China, 28 ENVTL SCI.
TECH. 805 (1994); Christos S. Christoforou et al., Passive Filtration of Airborne Particles
from Buildings Ventilated by Natural Convection: Design Procedures
and a Case Study at the Buddhist Cave Temples at Yungang, China, 30 AEROSOL SCIENCE
& TECHNOLOGY 530 (1999).
7. One example is the water-infrastructure projects executed in view of the Běijīng
2008 Summer Olympics, which gravely impacted the environment and, consequently, the
cultural heritage resting therein. See Chen Shen & Hong Chen, Cultural Heritage
Management in China: Current Practices and Problems, CULTURAL HERITAGE
MANAGEMENT: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 70, 77 (Phyllis Mauch Messenger & George S.
Smith eds., 2010).
8. See, e.g., Protocol Additions to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3; see also S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 16 (Apr. 3, 1991); G. A. Res. 47/37, (Nov. 25, 1992
(“Stressing” preambular clause).
9. Rodney Harrison, Beyond “Natural” and “Cultural” Heritage: Toward an
Ontological Politics of Heritage in the Age of Anthropocene, 8 HERITAGE AND SOCIETY 24,
30 (2015).
10. Relatedly, “one should not forget the political aspect of the decision as to what
is to be preserved for future generations. A central idea which accompanies the view of
cultural heritage as a form of inheritance is its characterisation as a non-renewable resource
akin to the environment.” Janet Blake, On Defining the Cultural Heritage, 49 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 61, 69 (2000).
11. “Nation” is employed here in its proper ethnical sense, and not in its geopolitical
connotation of “country” as it is at times confused for even in official documents (see, e.g.,
infra note 25).
12. Peter Häberle, A Constitutional Law for Future Generations – the “Other” Form
of the Social Contract: The Generation Contract, HANDBOOK OF INTERGENERATIONAL
JUSTICE 215, 221–225 (Joerg Chet Tremmel ed., 2006).
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situated in the territory of a single [S]tate, as well as the poor administrative
enforcement of those rules, affects the interests of people residing all over
the world, all of whom share in the common heritage of mankind.”13
International responsibility and international liability are not
synonymous, in that a State may be held liable for certain conducts which
do not reach the threshold or fall within the scope of internationally
wrongful acts.14 In extremely simplified and unavoidably vague terms, one
may affirm that international liability is about compensating (bilaterally,
through multilateral funds, by means of “participated” regional
organisations’ budget, and so forth) a state or non-state foreign party for
the harmful effects of a state or state-backed or “state-negligent” action
without admitting to the unlawfulness of such an action (i.e., without
accepting nominal, declarative responsibility for it, including consequences
like international retaliation and international sovereign lawsuit), thus
without the need for the injured party to prove neither the causal link
between the action and the seemingly resulting harm, nor between the
action and those state actors seemingly perpetrating it beyond a prima facie
administrative assessment of the harm. It is of the essence to emphasise
that responsibility-independent liability has nothing to do with charges of
morality: it is not a moral form of responsibility which replaces the legal
one,15 but a different legal device which comes into play whenever it is
unfeasible, inconvenient, unlawful, or evidence-wise untenable to invoke
responsibility. It is a different shade or manifestation of legal responsibility
that shifts the focus of policy priority from fault-attribution to moneydispensation, and it might even be considered concomitantly with judicial
intervention. Moreover, it is especially helpful when collective actions are
involved. It was argued elsewhere that natural catastrophes are not only
the product of deregulation in its meaning of “rules missing”, rather, they
are deeply embedded in regulatory schemes as they are already designed

13. Stefano Battini, The Procedural Side of Legal Globalization: The Case of the
World Heritage Convention, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 340, 346 (2011).
14. On the distinct application of these two doctrines, see Alexandre Kiss & Dinah
L. Shelton, Strict Liability in International Environmental Law, TAFSIR NDIAYE & RÜDIGER
WOLFUM, LAW OF THE SEA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES: LIBER
AMICORUM JUDGE THOMAS A. MENSAH, 1131–1152 (2007); Owen McIntyre, Responsibility
and Liability in International Law for Damage to Transboundary Fresh Water Resources,
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FRESHWATER LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 335–365
(Mara Tignino & Christian Bréhaut eds., 2018); Tullio Scovazzi, State Responsibility for
Environmental Harm, 12 YEARBOOK OF INT’L ENVTL. L. 43, 43 n. 2 (2001).
15. On faultless responsibility as a device for indirect attribution of moral forms of
responsibility, see Luciano Floridi, Faultless Responsibility: On the Nature and Allocation
of Moral Responsibility for Distributed Moral Actions, 374 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL
SOC’Y A (2016), https://perma.cc/E4Q8-3FAK.
157

5 - VECELLIOSEGATE_HELJ V27-1_ABBY_MCG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/24/20 2:02 PM

Hastings Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 27, No. 1, Winter 2021

and operated;16 in this sense, some might interpret this faultless-liability
concept as a form of institutionalised production of threats which are only
redressed monetarily whilst nobody is held accountable and publicly
shamed. This piece will argue that faultless liability can be deemed to be
the best possible compromise to protect cultural heritage in certain
circumstances and political contexts, and it works in a more sophisticated
manner compared to complete absence of shame. It calls for a rethinking
of policy and legal priorities, to save what can be saved and to insure against
risks whose uninsured concretisations would bear disastrous social
repercussions for local populations or even the global village. Eventually,
it caters for the regrettable truth that in the global governance of the
environment, “acknowledgment of responsibility is only weakly linked in
practice to accountability mechanisms unless they are formally established
within specific legal instruments”17 (such as liability ones, indeed).
Coherently with the rough definition of international liability just
provided, this contribution will not examine the direct applicability of the
international human rights law18 or international criminal law19 regimes to
cultural heritage protection, nor will it scrutinise the attribution of state
responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, per se.20 It will presuppose
that harms can be ascribed to a defined population in a roughly identifiable
territory, thus we will not refer to climate-change-induced migrations and
consequent abandonment of tangible heritage or re-adaptation of intangible
one, either.21 On the model of a variety of formal and informal, regional
and international instruments,22 it will rather analyse: state liability as a
component of the breach of States’ international obligations; state liability

16. See, e.g., Julia Dehm, International Law, Temporalities and Narratives of the
Climate Crisis, 4 LONDON R. INT’L L. 167, 188 (2016).
17. Steven Bernstein, The Absence of Great Power Responsibility in Global
Environmental Politics, 26(1) EUR. J. INT’L REL. 8, 21 (2020).
18. See, e.g., Leonard M. Hammer, Cultural Heritage Protection and Sacred Spaces:
Considering Alternative Approaches from Within the Human Rights Framework, 49 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 73, 73–113 (2018).
19. See generally Francesca Sironi De Gregorio, Attacking Cultural Property to
Destroy a Community: Heritage Destruction as a Crime Against Humanity and Genocide,
1 IUS IN ITINERE 3, 3–34 (2020) (a well-updated summary on said applicability).
20. For an illuminating challenge to the supposition that States owe injured parties full
compensation for internationally wrongful acts regardless of the former’s socio-economic
conjuncture, refer to Martins Paparinskis, A Case Against Crippling Compensation in
International Law of State Responsibility, 83(6) MOD. L. REV. 1246, 1246–1286 (2020),
https://perma.cc/E9EK-UW7U.
21. See Hee-Eun Kim, Changing Climate, Changing Culture: Adding the Climate
Change Dimension to the Protection of Intangible Cultural Heritage, 18 INT’L J. OF
CULTURAL PROP. 259, 261–65 (2011).
22. See HANNES DESCAMPS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON ENVIRONMENTAL
LIABILITY (2018) (systematising most relevant conventional laws on international liability
concerning environmental damage).
158
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for injurious but non-wrongful acts, emphasising the harm rather than the
conduct provoking it; state liability triggered by “soft” non-compliance
procedures incapsulated in contemporary environmental agreements,
mostly due to the fault of wilful negligence (culpable carelessness), based
on codified or customary due diligence expectations; and particularly
focusing on China, statutory liability of private parties before domestic
courts of the injuring or injured State(s), especially in cases of damage to
cultural heritage which can be reformulated as environmental damages,
adding to the property damage per se. These forms of liability invest
private parties when their property is violated,23 or States when their
heritage as public/collective good is damaged, but it might also involve the
international community as a whole when such an heritage is deemed of
public interest at large and conceptualised as “global commons”
(comparably to e.g., the seabed in the UN Convention for the Law of the
Sea). Some damages may engage shared forms of liability; conversely,
when numerous members of the international community are affected, it
would perhaps be worth considering the introduction of an actio popularis
doctrine in public international law, jointly with multilateral funds
dedicated to these occurrences. At any rate, as we will examine in greater
detail infra, certain legal solutions agreed upon internationally by States are
borderline between several typologies of liability; let us formulate an
example. Let us suppose we have thirty countries establishing a
multilateral fund for compensating each other in the aftermath of potential
transnational harm to their cultural heritage due to polluting activities from
their businesses, where each State contributes to the fund a percentage of
its GDP but regardless of what happens, cannot benefit from the fund for
more than one tenth of that fund’s total endowment, because the main
redress should come from businesses themselves and the fund enters into
play in the gravest emergencies only. Let us further suppose that one
subscriber to this fund pollutes other five members because of a very
dramatic incident occurred to one of its main factories situated along a
strategic border, and the laws of that polluting subscriber stipulate that the
business polluter shall pay up to a certain sum expressed in absolute terms,
and the rest might be covered by international funding. Thus, the private
polluter will contribute its part to clean up the environment and try to
restore the heritage of the five foreign States, and the State the polluter
belongs to will draw from the multilateral fund the remaining sum, till
reaching the cap previously mentioned, in accordance with the multilateral
arrangement’s rules. Under international law, is this a case of civil liability
of the polluter through the arrangement agreed upon by “its” State, or of

23. See Peter Tzeng, The State’s Right to Property Under International Law, 125
YALE L.J. 1805, 1805–19 (2016) (another standpoint on the matter is that of a highly
debatable “right to property” under international law, which will not be discussed here).
159
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state liability of the polluting State? Arguably both. This was a relatively
straightforward example, yet needless to stress, matters in real life are often
much more complicated. For example, some harms are hardly quantifiable
monetarily, and companies are subjected to different domestic regimes
depending on whether they are a parent company, a subsidiary, and so forth.
The two overarching purposes of this study are to demonstrate that the
legal device of responsibility-independent international liability is a useful
concept to frame cultural heritage protection (particularly that of the
“commons”) in environmental legal terms, and to theorise the extent to
which such a framing strategy would be accepted within the Chinese
understanding of global governance and the international legal order. The
rationale underpinning this case-study on China is that whilst much of the
pollution it produces remains within its borders, a non-negligible portion is
“exported,” especially to neighbouring territories such as the Korean
peninsula, Japan, Taiwan, or Siberia; to exemplify,
[a] chemical analysis of acid rain in Japan indicates that the
problem in Japan stems from emissions in China. Acid rain during
the winter in Niigata Prefecture, which is on the coast of the Sea
of Japan, contains a mix of sulfur and sulfer oxides consistent with
emissions from the burning of Chinese coal. Acid rain in Niigata
contained the same quantities of the sulfur isotopes S32 and S34
that are found in Chinese emissions. Sulfur oxides, nitrogen, and
other substances that cause acid rain originate from the burning of
fossil fuels such as coal and oil. Because the mixture of sulfur
oxides and sulfur isotopes varies according to the type of fossil
fuel consumed, it can be used to trace the origin of polluted air.
The burning of coal in China produces emissions with S34
concentrations; these are more than three times as high as that
found in emissions from factories in Niigata Prefecture itself. To
get a comprehensive view, scientists checked for S34 in rain and
snow in Nagaoka, Niigata Prefecture, during 1991. The results
showed that quantities of the acid rain–related substance rapidly
increased during the months of January, February, November, and
December of 1991, when seasonal winds from the Chinese
mainland blew across the Sea of Japan. China’s massive
consumption of coal, which is causing the acid rain problems in
Northeast Asia, is certain to become a global problem in the near
future. China refuses to allow any joint monitoring of its acid rain
problem, insisting that it is a domestic issue.24

24. PRADYUMNA P. KARAN, THE NON-WESTERN WORLD: ENVIRONMENT,
DEVELOPMENT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 108 (2006).
160
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This calls into debate both transboundary forms of pollution and polluting
activities contributing to global climate change. An in-depth understanding
of China’s preferences in terms of liability is a fortiori essential due to its
growth economically but also geopolitically within the international order.
As Beijing tries to uphold its image as a “responsible nation”25 or
“responsible power” [fù zérèn dàguó, 負責任大国], it will be crucial to
monitor the differences (if any) between China and the United States
(“US”) regarding the international environmental dossier, in its intersection
with the preservation of artistic expressions of outstanding value. Indeed,
the latter are threatened every day by polluting agents released in the
atmosphere, the soil, and the waters at unprecedented speed and volumes.26
An analysis of US laws that might help protect cultural heritage from
environmental hazards has already been concluded by another Author:
unsurprisingly, it mostly points to domestic legislation whilst dedicating a
few paragraphs to the American stances about concerted international
efforts to tackle the issue.27 In this sense, China is certainly forwardlooking, and deserving of an analysis on his own.
II. Environment and Culture
One’s sense of self, both personal and cultural, is deeply
embedded in a particular parcel of land [ . . . ].28
II.1
Does the environment legally “include”
culture? Or is it the reverse?
Legacies of both nature and culture belong not simply to their
places and peoples of origin but to all the earth and its inhabitants.
The ethos of global ecological health, of a global genetic
commons and of the global cultural heritage is of like concern.
The iconic sculptures of classical antiquity are no less at home in
London and Paris than in Athens, the Shakespearean legacy is as
much American or German as English, and Stonehenge is the
whole world’s property—the British merely its custodians. Relics

25. Second National Communication on Climate Change of The People’s Republic
of China 9 (2012).
26. See generally CESÁREO SAIZ-JIMÉNEZ, AIR POLLUTION AND CULTURAL HERITAGE
(Balkema, 2005).
27. Casey J. Snyder, Law, Cultural Heritage, and Climate Change in the United
States, 36 PACE ENVTL. L REV. 95, 95–140 (2018).
28. Marshall Islands v. United States, 39(5) ILM 1219 (2002).
161
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of nature and antiquity alike warrant protection as non-renewable
and in limited supply. Once gone, they are gone for ever.29
Protecting the environment and preserving cultural heritage are not
exactly equivalent: first, damages to certain forms of heritage may prove
even more irreversible than those to the environment;30 second, the
environment exists regardless of humans and subjective human
interpretation, as well as functionally to other species too; third, heritage
erosion may happen acutely else than gradually; fourth, while most
environmental damages can be economically quantified, “pricing” the
destruction of a universally recognised monument is nearly impossible,31
and anyway nonsensical. This notwithstanding, the long-standing and
simplistic juxtaposition of nature and culture rests on a false dichotomy the
law needs to disrupt in order to protect both. Nature and culture are distinct
yet interdependent, thus the law needs to keep a distinction between them
whilst never losing sight of their mutual dependency in complex human
environments. Destruction of—or serious damage to—cultural heritage
due to pollution and other hazardous environment-impacting activities
cannot be regarded as isolated incidents anymore, because of how
numerous, how widespread they are, and the recurring patterns observable
in their unfolding. In fact, this is not the first work suggesting to enhance
cultural heritage protection by recourse to environmental law concepts and
practices: among others, one American scholar pursued the same path
already, making the case for cultural justice to borrow from environmental
justice in order to uphold the rights of indigenous communities.32 The
present essay explores a different angle, though: that of prevention and
redress of polluting effects on monuments by means of “fault-independent”
liability schemes developed in the field of international environmental law
(“IEL”), learning from domestic experiences. We shall start with an
exercise in definition.
Defining the term “environment” can be a tedious and frustrating
commitment, yet it seems increasingly (but not firmly) accepted it shall

29. David Lowenthal, Natural and Cultural Heritage, 11 INT’L J. OF HERITAGE STUD.
81, 85 (2005) (emphasis added).
30. See also Helen Phillips, Adaptation to Climate Change at UK World Heritage
Sites: Progress and Challenges, 5(3) HIST. ENV’T: POL’Y & PRAC. 288, 289 (2014).
31. See, e.g., CHRISTOFER LEYGRAF ET AL., ATMOSPHERIC CORROSION 3 (Wiley 2nd
ed. 2016). A complete compilation of documents related to threats to monuments by
polluting agents in the atmosphere is kept by UNECE’s International Cooperative
Programme on Effects on Materials including Historic and Cultural Monuments (ICP
Materials); most of these documents are available online at https://perma.cc/U3CJ-B3VS.
32. See Derek Fincham, Justice and the Cultural Heritage Movement: Using
Environmental Justice to Appraise Art and Antiquities Disputes, 20 VA. J. OF SOC. POL’Y
AND L. 43–95 (2012).
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include intangible cultural elements.33 The Council of Europe’s (“CoE”)34
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities
Dangerous to the Environment, signed in Lugano on 21 June 1993, includes
only the tangible components of heritage within its definitory exercise,35
and yet, from both a spiritual and economic viewpoint, cultural practices
live in a symbiotic relationship with their human and natural ecosystem.
For example, Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Lake in the Mekong River Basin—
which is the largest freshwater lake in Southeast Asia and one of the world’s
most productive wetland ecosystems—provides local populations with
touristic attractions in the form of cultural heritage, with indigenous
community heavily reliant on its floating villages to earn a living.36 It is
therefore essential for firms to play a major role in advancing sustainability
schemes capable of offsetting the externalities pollution produces over the
cultural heritage of communities made of individuals who are neither
producers or consumers of such firms’ products.37 Equally partial are the
approaches that highlight the intangible dimension only, although at
times—for example when it comes to certain maritime environments—
such a choice can be justified; the 1976 Convention for the Protection of
the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean
(“Barcelona Convention”) provides a convincing reference to this end.38 In

33. Ben Boer, Environmental principles and the right to a quality environment,
PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 52, 54 (Ludwig Kramer et al. eds., Edward Elgar 2017).
34. The reader is reminded of the difference between the Council of Europe, a nonEU institution located in Strasbourg, and the two EU institutions named Council of the
European Union and European Council (of Ministries).
35. “[ . . . P]roperty which forms part of the cultural heritage; and the characteristic
aspects of the landscape” [Art.2(10), emphasis added]. Indeed, even the second component
is arguably made of tangible monuments, although shaped by the interaction between them
and nature as defined by humans. There is a long-standing debate in literature on the
possible opposability of a “public” concept of cultural heritage versus a “private” one of
cultural property, yet the two are too often used interchangeably in international policy
outcomes, so confusingly that the debate will not be reported or elaborated upon in the
present article. See Derek Fincham, The Distinctiveness of Property and Heritage, 115
PENN STATE L. REV. 641, 641–84 (2011).
36. Malyne Neang et al., Trade-offs Between Ecosystem Services and Opportunity
Costs in Maintaining the Tonle Sap Lake Agro-ecosystem (Cambodia), WATER AND POWER:
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE AND STRATEGIES FOR SUSTAINABILITY IN THE LOWER
MEKONG BASIN 89, 91–93 (Mart A. Stewart et al. eds., 2019).
37. Fredrick Ahen et al., Institutional and Market Forces: The Dominant Logic of
Strategic Corporate Responsibility and Innovative Value Co-Creation, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS, SUSTAINABILITY AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 97, 117 (Perez
Gonzalez et al. eds., 2013).
38. “The area has a high representative value with respect to the cultural heritage,
due to the existence of environmentally sound traditional activities integrated with nature
which support the well-being of local populations” [Annex 1, Section B, Art.2(f)]. This is
part of the 2005 amended version of the 1976 Convention, signed in Athens on 9 July 2004.
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the European Union (“EU”), Directive 2001/42/EC,39 still in force,
perfectly hits the target where it lays down that environmental assessments
should provide information on both tangible and intangible heritage40
whilst particularly emphasising its eventual vulnerability.41 Drawing also
from Directives 85/337/EEC and 97/11/EC,42 a more recent Directive
(2011/92/EU)43 reinforces these dicta and systematises the whole subject.
Furthermore, Directive 2003/4/EC44 considers “environmental
information” to concern also the “conditions of human life, cultural sites
and built structures inasmuch as they are or may be affected by the state of
the elements of the environment.”45 Finally, “[t]he extent to which each
option takes account of relevant social, economic and cultural concerns and
other relevant factors specific to the locality”46 is listed by Directive
2004/35/EC,47 last amended in 2019, among the criteria to be considered
when deciding what compensatory solution to adopt in the aftermath of an
environmental damage within the (today-)EU. However, no official policy
document addresses paradoxical situations like the one that “by the simple
magic of trading more, [the EU] could make progress towards meeting its
reduced GHG emissions targets with almost no [change in] people’s
consumption levels and habits”48 and what this means for the sake of
protecting heritage Europe-wise and extraterritorially.

39. Council Directive 2001/42, 2001 O.J. (L 197) (EC).
40. Id. at Annex I ¶ f (the likely significant effects on the environment, including on
issues such as biodiversity, population, human health, fauna, flora, soil, water, air, climatic
factors, material assets, cultural heritage including architectural and archaeological
heritage, landscape and the interrelationship between the above factors) (emphasis added).
41. Id. at Annex II ¶ 2 (the value and vulnerability of the area likely to be affected
due to [its] special natural characteristics or cultural heritage).
42. Lazarela Kalezić, Environmental Impact Assessment in a Trans-Boundary
Context in Montenegro, ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE:
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION 213, 216 (Montini Massimiliano
et al. eds., 2011).
43. Council Directive 2011/92, 2011 O.J. (L.92) (EC).
44. Council Directive 2003/4, 2003 O.J. (L 41) (EC).
45. Id. at Art.3(1)(f) (emphasis added).
46. Id. at Art.1.3.1 of Annex II – “Remedying of Environmental Damage”.
47. Council Directive 2004/35, 2004 O.J. (L 143) (EC); see Kleoniki C. Pouikli,
Overview of the implementation of the directive 2004/35/EC on environmental liability with
regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage at European level, 57
DESALINATION & WATER TREATMENT 11520, 11520–27 (2016) (European Directives are
not immediately enforceable in the Member States: they need to be transposed into their
domestic legal orders first; as for this one particularly).
48. Olivier De Schutter, Linking trade and climate change: what room for human
rights? in CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
LAW PERSPECTIVE 201, 203–4 (Mouloud Boumghar eds., 2016).
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[C]ultural objects can be seen as part of the physical public
space that conditions our world view and which is part of what we
normally call “the environment” or the “landscape”. This role of
cultural heritage as part of public space opens the way to a holistic
approach […] that brings together cultural and natural heritage
and takes into account the interactive link of such heritage with
the real life of people inhabiting it. It is this holistic conception of
heritage that underlies the very international efforts at developing
normative instruments for the protection of landscape.49
In 2017, within the World Heritage Convention (“WHC”) framework,
the International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on World Heritage
(“IIPFWH”) was established during the 41st session of the World Heritage
Committee (“WHComm”), but it has yet to prove its value. Even if the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(“UNESCO”) has carried out some successful policy work internationally,
resulting in a number of soft instruments adopted over the last couple of
decades,50 there is no structural interaction between natural heritage and
cultural heritage that is rendered justiciable (neither worldwide, nor
regionally). The 1964 Venice Charter for the Conservation and Restoration

49. Francesco Francioni, Plurality and Interaction of Legal Orders in the
Enforcement of Cultural Heritage Law, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL HERITAGE
LAW 9, 11 (James Russel Grodley et al. eds., Oxford University Press 2013); see Andrew
Butler & Ingrid Sarlöv-Herlin, Changing landscape identity—practice, plurality, and
power, 44 LANDSCAPE RESEARCH 271, 272 (2019) (Interestingly, the Council of Europe’s
European Landscape Convention, signed in Florence on December 20, 2000, defines the
landscape as part of cultural heritage and not vice versa (see the relevant clause in the
Preamble); this might bear legal significance. On this Convention).
50. See, e.g., UNESCO, Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present
Generations Towards Future Generation, (1997) (“Conscious…” and “Bearing in mind…”
preambular clauses, together with its Art.5); Tehran Declaration on Human Rights and the
Environment (May 14, 2009); see also, UNESCO’s First Draft of a Preliminary Text of a
Declaration on Ethical Principles in Relation to Climate Change (Rabat, Sep. 24, 2016) (in
its art. 3, speaks of “Avoiding Harm” in terms of general access to justice and preventive
measures rather than international state liability); see also World Network of Biosphere
Reserves (UNESCO is compiling a list as the premise for its Man and the Biosphere
Programme, targeting sites where extraordinarily diverse nature interacts with valuable
cultural expressions of human presence and legacy); see also International Union for
Conservation of Nature, 2010 Draft Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth,
(Apr. 22, 2018) (In 1995 the IUCN proposed a Draft Covenant on Environment and
Development that explicitly enunciated the principle of intergenerational equity followed
up by UNESCO two years later via the aforementioned Declaration; the 2013 UN SecretaryGeneral’s report on Intergenerational Solidarity and the Needs of Future Generations is also
of interest. Nevertheless, the 2017 Declaration of Ethical Principles in Relation to Climate
Change fails to take a chance for elaborating on the climate-change threat to cultural
heritage).
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of Monuments and Sites, and its Australian and Chinese counterparts,51 do
not elaborate on the nexus between environment and heritage, let alone by
mentioning liabilities. Neither the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) nor the WHC mention climate-change
impacts on heritage protection, whilst the respective secretariats merely
speak of information-sharing forms of collaboration.52 The List of Sites in
Danger53 is to date the only nexus established between heritage in peril and
environmental causes, as further delineated in the relevant Guidelines.54
UNECE, for its part, commissioned precious guidelines55 and sponsored
binding covenants. For example, the 1991 Convention on Environmental
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context signed at Espoo, in
Finland, mentions environmental impacts on monuments in its Article
1(vii); disgracefully, China is not a party to it. China is not a party to the

51. See Burra Charter, (1979); Principles for the Conservation of Heritage Sites in
China (Zhōngguó wénwù gǔjī bǎohù zhǔnzé, 中国文物古迹保护准则), (2000). Both were
promoted by the International Council on Monuments and Sites (“ICOMOS”), a prestigious
yet private consortium of archaeologists and other heritage and art professionals. See also
Declaration on the Conservation of the Setting of Heritage Structures, Sites and Areas, (Oct.
21, 2005) (adopted in Xi’an (China) by the 15th General Assembly of ICOMOS. Other two
relevant private consortia are the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and
Restoration of Cultural Property (“ICCROM”) and the World Monuments Fund).
52. Alessandro Chechi, The Cultural Dimension of Climate Change: Some Remarks
on the Interface between Cultural Heritage and Climate Change Law, CLIMATE CHANGE AS
A THREAT TO PEACE: IMPACTS ON CULTURAL HERITAGE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 161, 181–
83 (Sabine Von Schorlemer et al., Peter Lang 2014). This, despite the fact that Art.6
UNFCCC encodes the need for international cooperation, which one should not limit to
interinstitutional “cheap-talking”.
53. World Heritage Convention, Convention concerning the Protection of World
Culture and Natural Heritage Art. 11(4) (Nov. 16, 1972); Herdis Hølleland et al., Naming,
Shaming and Fire Alarms: The Compilation, Development and Use of the List of World
Heritage in Danger, 8(1) TRANSNAT’L ENVTL L. 1, 16 (2019).
54. World Heritage Convention, Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of
the World Heritage Convention, (Oct. 26. 2016), ¶¶ 177–191. (These Guidelines are preeminent a guidance in progressively expanding the scope of—and rationale underpinning—
cultural heritage: “[t]he OGs can be modified to accommodate developments, including
changes in the evolving concept of heritage value or significance. And indeed, in 1992, a
new category of sites was introduced to the World Heritage Convention: the category of
“cultural landscapes.” This was a significant innovation, as it demonstrated the shift from
monumental heritage to a more complex interaction between people and their environment);
Francesco Bandarin, International trade in indigenous cultural heritage: Comments from
UNESCO in light of its international standard-setting instruments in the field of culture,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN INDIGENOUS CULTURAL HERITAGE: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES
306, 309 (Christoph B. Graner et al. eds., 2012).
55. Guidance on Land-Use Planning, the Siting of Hazardous Activities and Related
Safety Aspects, Economic Commission for Europe, U.N. Doc. ECE/CP.TEIA/35 (2017).
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1992 Helsinki Convention56 on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial
Accidents (also known as “UNECE Industrial Accidents Convention”)
either, that the US has signed at least (with ratification “pending” ad
libitum, as it is often the case with US-signed treaties). Another UNECEsponsored treaty is the 1992 Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use
of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (also known as
“UNECE Water Convention”), whose scope encompasses the “landscape
and historical monuments or other physical structures or the interaction
among these factors[, as well as the] effects on the cultural heritage or
socio-economic conditions resulting from alterations to those factors.”57
Placed at the forefront of the global environmentalist discourse, the
EU represents this normative struggle between “culture” and
“environment” at its best. Even if it followed up the 1979 CoE Convention
on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (also
known as “Bern Convention”) with its own Council Directive 92/43/EEC
on the Conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (also
known as “Habitats Directive”),58 and the interactions between the two
“heritages” are obvious in these two mutually-shaping59 legal instruments,
Brussels still lacks a coherent and comprehensive piece of legislation (and
background vision) about how to concretise and enforce such linkages:60 its
approach is still project-based.61 In the field of archaeology only, “elements
56. Not to be confused with the 1974 Convention on the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, known as “Helsinki Convention”, as well, then revised
in 1992 and entered into force on 17th January 2000 as “HELCOM Convention.” In sum,
there are three “Helsinki Conventions” which might cause confusion with each other: the
HELCOM, the Industrial Accidents one, and the Water one. All of them have been signed
in 1992.
57. Helsinski Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses
and International Lakes, art 1.2, Mar. 17, 1992. See James D. Fry & Agnes Chong,
International Water Law and China’s Management of Its International Rivers, 39 B.C. INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 227 (2019).
58. Nicolas De Sadeleer, Assessment and Authorisation of Plans and Projects
Having a Significant Impact on Natura 2000 Sites, EU ENVIRONMENTAL AND PLANNING
LAW ASPECTS OF LARGE-SCALE PROJECTS 281, 289–90 (Bernard Vanheusden et al. eds.,
2016) (judicial application of the Habitats Directive).
59. Sebastian Oberthür et al., Conceptual Foundations of Institutional Interaction,
INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTION IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: SYNERGY AND
CONFLICT AMONG INTERNATIONAL AND EU POLICIES 19, 30 (Sebastian Oberthür et al. eds.,
2006).
60. Scoping study on the review of links and complementary between Natura 2000
and cultural sites (2010), https://perma.cc/CE62-8TTR.
61. Preserving our Heritage, Improving Our Environment: Volume II – Cultural
Heritage Research: FP5, FP6 and Related Project (2009), https://perma.cc/RQ44-Z8QR;
see also, Vasiliki Karageorgou, Τhe Permissibility of Projects for Interbasin Water Transfer
under the Prism of the EU Water and Environmental Legislation, ENVIRONMENTAL AND
PLANNING LAW ASPECTS OF LARGE-SCALE PROJECTS 249, 249–77 (Bernard Vanheusden et
al. eds., 2016).
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of the archaeological heritage” are defined by the CoE as “all remains and
objects and any other traces of mankind from past epochs [. . .] the
preservation and study of which help to retrace the history of mankind and
its relation with the natural environment;”62 however, this expressed
linkage reports mankind—and not archaeological discoveries directly—to
the environment. Not infrequently, natural heritage sites perfectly overlap
with cultural heritage ones,63 to such an extent that a double-sided
instrument which ties them together is warranted. The CoE itself remarked
“the importance of handing down to future generations a system of cultural
references, improving the urban and rural environment and thereby
fostering the economic, social and cultural development of States and
regions,”64 thus binding States to making “the conservation, promotion and
enhancement of the architectural heritage a major feature of cultural,
environmental and planning policies.”65 The reader will have noted by now
that this piecemeal approach still compartmentalises heritage in
“archaeological”, “architectural”, and so forth, whilst to address threats
arising from transboundary pollution and climate change, a single
comprehensive instrument laying down clear-cut liabilities for all potential
actors involved is urged for.
II.2 Loss of traditions, displacement of identities,
sense of alienation
In English tort law, apart from physical injuries, non-physical yet
quantifiable pure economic losses (those that appear on a balance-sheet,
e.g., those to property) are opposed to consequential economic losses
stemming therefrom (reputational damages, career slowdowns, etc.). All
these losses concur to “stranding” the underlying assets.66 Nevertheless,
besides these damages which can be redressed monetarily, there exists a
category of losses related to goods which cannot be translated into an
“assets” language and cannot be traded; whilst international negotiations
focus on the first category (economic losses), the second stands legally as
a largely unregulated grey area.67 Translating this scheme internationally,
under the instrumental umbrella of environmental law, non-economic

62. Valletta Convention, June 1985, E.T.S 143, Art. 1(1).
63. Natural and Cultural Heritage in Europe: Working together within the Natura
2000 Network (2019), 13–16, https://perma.cc/JA3U-6TZ4.
64. Granada Convention, Oct. 3, 1985, E.T.S 121.
65. Id. at. Art.10.3.
66. See Ben Caldecott, Introduction to Special Issue: Stranded Assets and the
Environment, 7 J. OF SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 1, 2 (2017).
67. Andrea C. Simonelli, The Ethical Challenges in the Context of Climate Loss and
Damage, ETHICAL VALUES AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME 213, 216
(Hugh Breakey et al. eds., 2016).
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losses—which may “include loss of life, human health, cultural heritage,
ecosystem services and indigenous knowledge[, and] can occur as direct
and indirect consequences of climate change, including negative sideeffects of adaptation” call for solutions which go beyond the mere financial
reparation or risk-transfer makeshifts: most of these losses, e.g., to
traditional rituals, protected species and natural habitats, water and soil, are
irreplaceable and unmonetizable, and shall be addressed by contextdependent policies freed from a market-efficiency mindset.68 “Loss of
cultural identity, sense of place or indigenous knowledge, for example, are
inextricably tied to a community’s integrity” and “no replica of the lost
object will be regarded as equivalent to the original. [. . . ] Whatever
amount of money is paid to a harmed community, if the ends are
irreplaceable, by definition such payments cannot make the community
whole again.”69 Even the language spoken by indigenous communities is
modelled on their habitat, their collective memory, comprising both natural
and cultural heritage.70 Anthropological studies have placed emphasis on
this language-nature link, demonstrating for example how the native
aborigines (Indios) of Amazonia coined and still keep sixteen (sic) different
expressions to indicate the green colour,71 or how in Colombia “an
indigenous territory, although possibly demarcated and delimited, is
defined not primarily by its borders and limits but by geographical marks
which represent the bond between a group of humans, landscape and
history.”72 This second example may also urge a rethinking of sovereignty
in the shared management of cultural-environmental resources between
indigenous and non-indigenous claimants.73
Article 8 of the Paris Agreement finally brought the issue under the
spotlight, yet the Warsaw International Mechanism (“WIM”) established to
68. See Olivia Serdeczny, THE ETHICAL CHALLENGES IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE
LOSS AND DAMAGE (DEUTSCHES INSTITUT FÜR ENTWICKLUNGSPOLITIK 2016).
69. Ivo Wallimann-Helmer, The Ethical Challenges in the Context of Climate Loss
and Damage, LOSS AND DAMAGE FROM CLIMATE CHANGE: CONCEPTS, METHODS AND
POLICY OPTIONS 39, 50–1 (Reinhard Mechler et al. eds., 2019).
70. JANET MCINTYRE-MILLS, CRITICAL SYSTEMIC PRAXIS FOR SOCIAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: PARTICIPATORY POLICY DESIGN AND GOVERNANCE FOR A GLOBAL
AGE 48 (2003).
71. See, e.g., MÁRCIA THEÓPHILO, NEL NIDO DELL’AMAZZONIA (Interlinea, 2015).
Her anthropology-sensitive poetry production moulds an epic of the Amazonia, identifying
and elucidating the implications of the loss of natural habitats as an impoverishment of
language, habits, community, and ultimately identity. See also MÁRCIA THEÓPHILO,
AMAZZONIA VERDE D’ACQUA (Mondadori, 2020); MÁRCIA THEÓPHILO, AMAZZONIA RESPIRO
DEL MONDO (Passigli, 2005); MÁRCIA THEÓPHILO, FORESTA MIO DIZIONARIO (Tracce, 2003).
72. Juan Alvaro Echeverri, Territory as Body and Territory as Nature: Intercultural
Dialogue?, THE LAND WITHIN: INDIGENOUS TERRITORY AND THE PERCEPTION OF
ENVIRONMENt 230, 232 (Alexandre Surrallés et al. eds., IWGIA 2005).
73. See Austen L. Parrish, Changing Territoriality, Fading Sovereignty, and the
Development of Indigenous Group Rights, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 291, 291–313 (2007).
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further the Conference’s work on the matter has proven inefficient so far.74
As “[c]limate change forces people to make choices and face situations that
lead to radical, but not necessarily sustainable transformations of society,”75
cultural heritage is under siege across all continents and its damage forms
part of said transformations, which are unsustainable insofar as they
transfer onto the next generations a poorer legacy from the past, as well as
the burden of living in insufficiently rooted (thus often war-ravaged)
civilisations. “Nuclear waste, hazardous waste disposal, the loss of
biological diversity, and ozone depletion, for example, have significant
effects on the natural and cultural heritage of more distant generations.”76
Hence, it is dutiful towards those yet to come that humans agree on legal
systems which are capable of preserving the legacy of history and pass it
on as integrally as possible. Whereas faults on climate change are rather
difficult to apportion, cultural heritage should be legally shielded at least
from transnational polluting activities liabilities thereof are possible to
ascertain and settle. Indeed,
[t]here are a number of factors that increase the need for
transnational environmental cooperation. First, the breakup of
countries means that some national environmental problems may
become transnational concerns. Second, enhanced remote sensing
and terrestrial monitoring can better spot transboundary
environmental issues. Third, advances in technology can create
new pollution problems, as in the case of [chlorofluorocarbons].
Fourth, population growth places stresses on ecosystems, which
may affect multiple countries. Fifth, the rise of globalization and
regionalism results in more trade and movement of factors of
production, both of which can augment transnational pollution
flows. Sixth, the enhanced importance of social media offers
74. “[T]he range of approaches to financing loss and damage response efforts listed
in the initial two-year workplan for the WIM [Executive Committee] display major gaps:
almost none were devised to apply to slow-onset events or to non-economic loss and
damage. Traditional insurance is designed to provide compensation for monetary damages
triggered by sudden, unpredictable and infrequent disasters. [ . . . A]n insurance-based
approach does not encompass an appropriate response to non-economic loss and damage.
Risk insurance does not include any means to value or repay non-economic loss and damage,
including loss of heritage, culture, languages and ecosystems. Social and economic
development concerns should be central in proposals to address loss and damage.” Jonathan
Gewirtzman et al., Financing Loss and Damage: Reviewing Options Under the Warsaw
International Mechanism, 18 CLIMATE POL’Y 1076, 1083 (2018); see Serdeczny supra note
68, at 8.
75. Mia Landauer & Sirkku Juhola, Loss and Damage in the Rapidly Changing
Arctic, LOSS AND DAMAGE FROM CLIMATE CHANGE: CONCEPTS, METHODS AND POLICY
OPTIONS 425, 429 (Reinhard Mechler et al. eds., 2019).
76. Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations and Sustainable
Development, 8 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 345, 348 (1992).
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environmental activists a powerful tool to coalesce public opinion
to push for transboundary pollution control and agreements.77
II.3 Why “updating UNESCO” might not suffice
The Parties shall encourage research, development,
monitoring and cooperation related to [… t]he identification of
trends over time and the scientific understanding of the wider
effects of sulphur, nitrogen and volatile organic compounds and
photochemical pollution on human health, including their
contribution to concentrations of particulate matter, the
environment, in particular acidification and eutrophication, and
materials, especially historic and cultural monuments, taking into
account the relationship between sulphur oxides, nitrogen oxides,
ammonia, volatile organic compounds and tropospheric ozone
[. . .].78
Cultural heritage sits under siege worldwide due to air and water
pollution, (illegal) waste discharging, artificial noise, global warming, toxic
emissions, and more generally, environmental degradation and climate
change:79 unprecedented sea storms, typhoons, and hurricanes,
desertification, flooding, acid rain, rising sea levels, permafrost melting,
land exploitation, oceans trash dump, extreme weather conditions and
temperatures, coastal erosion, deforestation, and so forth, are causing
irreparable damage to or even disappearance of valuable expressions of
tangible and intangible heritage,80 up to the true extremes of “cultural
genocides.” Acidification, eutrophication, and human toxicity have
regional effects at worst, but climate change and ozone depletion are

77. Todd Sandler, Environmental cooperation: Contrasting international
environmental, 69 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 345, 348 (2017).
78. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution to
Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-Level Ozone art 8(g), May. 17, 2005, 81
U.N.T.S 2319 (emphasis added); see also Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emission art. 6(d), Aug. 5,
1988, 122 U.N.T.S 2030; “Concerned…” in the Preamble to the Protocol to the Convention
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or
Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Per Cent, Sep. 2, 1987, 215 U.N.T.S 1480 (none
of the other Protocols to the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution
mentions damage to monuments or other culturally, historically, artistically noteworthy
sites).
79. JAMES NAFZIGER ET AL., TOWARDS A PRESERVATION-SUSTAINABILITY NEXUS:
APPLYING LCA TO REDUCE THE ENVIRONMENTAL FOOTPRINT OF MODERN BUILT HERITAGE
253 (2010).
80. See Cristina Sabbioni et al., Vulnerability of cultural heritage to climate change,
CoE Report AP/CAT 44, 10-11 (2008), https://perma.cc/XW6Z-2ZW2.
171

5 - VECELLIOSEGATE_HELJ V27-1_ABBY_MCG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/24/20 2:02 PM

Hastings Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 27, No. 1, Winter 2021

problems of global reach;81 for example, higher ozone concentration causes
the corrosion of heritage sites due to the oxidising ozone reactions.82 Not
rarely, “[t]he damage affects not only the artistic content of the work but
also the [edifice] where […] the artifact has a supporting function”
architecturally.83 Tangible cultural heritage is susceptible to climatechange-induced damage due to two elements: the effects of this
phenomenon on its constitutive materials (like in the case of acid rains84),
and the massive consequences for the territory where it is located (such as
flooding).85 When on November 12, 2019 Venice experienced the secondgravest flooding in its history and the Basilica di San Marco was severely
damaged, the mayor credited the regrettable event to climate change.86
Intangible heritage cannot be directly affected, yet the legacy and practices
that revolve around biodiversity, natural cycles (involving both flora and
fauna), animal migrations, or manmade vestiges can be severely
endangered by this set of phenomena.87 Additionally, tangible heritage
may bear meaning—or acquire a universal rather than local one, thus

81. Maria Karoglou et al., Towards a Preservation-Sustainability Nexus: Applying
LCA to Reduce the Environmental Footprint of Modern Built Heritage, 11 SUSTAINABILITY
6147, 6159 (2019).
82. Stefan Doytchinov, European UNESCO Cultural Heritage sites and the air
pollution effects, 14 AIR POLLUTION 645, 652 (2006); for a country case-study, see Augusto
Screpanti & Alessandra De Marco, Corrosion on cultural heritage buildings in Italy: A role
for ozone?, 157 ENVTL POLLUTION 1513, 1513–20 (2009).
83. Marco Del Monte, The Cultural Heritage: Causes of damage, SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY AND EUROPEAN CULTURAL HERITAGE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN
SYMPOSIUM, BOLOGNA, ITALY, 13-16 JUNE 1989 78, 82 (1991).
84. GABRIELA KÜTTING, ENVIRONMENT, SOCIETY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
TOWARDS MORE EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 88 (2000).
85. By absurdity, if e.g., Venice sinks, the WHC is no longer applicable, and even
the 2011 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage only
protects a cultural object after 100 years of being partially or totally immersed [Art.1.1(a)].
86. John Henley and Angela Giuffrida, Two people die as Venice floods at highest
level in 50 years, GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2019), https://perma.cc/8XYP-JP39; Acqua alta a
Venezia, toccati 187 cm. Allerta Basilica di San Marco. Anziano fulminato [High Water in
Venice], QUOTIDIANO (Nov. 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/B24E-HGNX. See also Jonathan
Jones, Venice has the battle against extreme weather down to a fine art, GUARDIAN (Nov.
12, 2012), https://perma.cc/KQA2-6TD7; Tara Law, It’s Not Just Flooding in Venice.
Here’s How Climate Change Threatens World Heritage Sites Everywhere, TIME (Nov. 22,
2019) https://perma.cc/7VBL-ATW5.
87. Elizabeth Thomas, Protecting Cultural Rights in the South Pacific Islands: Using
UNESCO and Marine Protected Areas to Plan for Climate Change, 29(3) FORDHAM ENVTL
L. REV. 413, 417–420, 440, 464 (2018) (“[i]n Papua New Guinea, many indigenous peoples
believe that animals, plants, geographical features, and objects have spirits, tying their
beliefs in those spirits to the natural world. [Similarly,] the Maasai tribes have an almost
sacred relationship with cattle and the lands where their animals feed[,] one tribe on the
island of Chuuk believes that their ancestors’ spirits inhabit the coral reefs that surround
their homes[, and [i]f the Chamorros cannot access their island, they risk losing access to
where they believe their ancestral spirits reside.”).
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“upgrading” its “status” before the international community—because of
its “association with events, living traditions, ideas, beliefs or artistic and
literary works of outstanding universal significance.”88 One consequence
is that relocating immovable heritage highly decreases its contextdependent value,89 so much that its uniqueness might be rendered
meaningless. In fact, “[t]he ‘lived experience of culture’, the ‘identity’,
‘belonging’, and ‘sense of place’ together with the values, traditions, and
cultural practices need to be taken into consideration to determine the
acceptability of the climate change adaptation solution.”90
This
notwithstanding, the reader is advised that cultural practices revolving
around monuments (or other types of “physical” heritage) are, from an
economic and status-appraising perspective, not necessarily valueenhancing, due to the “predisposition” of certain tangible heritage to be
neglected, deserted, damaged, or even destroyed by the very same people
who crafted it in the first place, as part of a cultural ritual which might prove
hard to understand, yet shall be never interfered with:
We can all sit around and nod our heads sagely when we are
told that the destruction by the Zuni of their war gods forms part
of a cultural practice that should be respected and that the attempt
to preserve these gods would be culturally disrespectful; or
likewise, when the Igbo people destroy their mbaris as part of a
cultural practice, after having painstakingly erected them. Yet no
such indulgence was evident when the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan dynamited the World Heritage-listed, sixth century
Buddhas of Bamiyan, having described them as being “idols” and
thus religiously offensive. The cases clearly have significant
differences, one of the more important in cultural terms being that
the Taliban were destroying something that belonged not to their
own culture, but arguably to someone else’s, although they
claimed a cultural imperative for the act of destruction.91

88. Rosemary J. Coombe et al., Indigenous Cultural Heritage in Development and
Trade: Perspectives from the Dynamics of Cultural Heritage Law and Policy,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN INDIGENOUS CULTURAL HERITAGE: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES
272, 284 (Christoph B. Graber et al. eds., 2012).
89. CHERYL BENARD, ELI SUGARMAN, & HOLLY REHM, CULTURAL HERITAGE VS.
MINING ON THE NEW SILK ROAD? FINDING TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS FOR MES AYNAK AND
BEYOND. Conference Report, June 4–5, 2012, School of Advanced International Studies,
Johns Hopkins University 41–42 (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2012).
90. Elena Sesana, et al., Adapting Cultural Heritage to Climate Change Risks:
Perspectives of Cultural Heritage Experts in Europe, 8 GEOSCIENCES 305, 320 (2018).
91. Fiona Macmillan, The protection of cultural heritage: Common heritage of
humankind, national cultural “patrimony” or private property?, 64(3) N. IR. LEGAL Q. 351,
355 (2013).
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In sum, there are potentially countless variables to consider when
attaching economic value to cultural heritage for the purpose of e.g.,
quantifying damages (thus requesting appropriate compensation), splitting
liabilities, or assessing insurance-covered risks. Value variation may be
attributed to tangible heritage depending on the intangible practices that
either valorise or risk compromising said heritage’s survival and prosperity.
Furthermore, heritage of universal value calls for aggravated guardianship
and financial burdens on its custodians, and insuring it against serious
damage up to destruction might be impractical even for States; such
heritage is, so to speak, of common concern for mankind.92
Besides the tangible/intangible dichotomy, which has already been
problematised elsewhere93 and comes as particularly inappropriate to
appreciate the interpenetrations between nature and monuments through
non-Western lenses,94 a possibly more relevant distinction is that between
movable and immovable objects; the former UNESCO’s Chief of Legal
and Treaty Section (International Standards) so recalls:
The fact that in many countries Cultural Heritage and
property is often protected by legislation does not, per se, exclude
the climate change threats. First, with regard to immovable
Cultural Heritage, the law cannot remove it from its situs and
protect it fully from the impact of nature. Second, with regard to
movable cultural property, the law can organize a removal of the
property from its situs and its gathering in museums, which does
protect from most, not all, impacts of nature. However, museums
can hardly protect from flooding or other serious effects of climate
change. For instance, some museums in the Czech Republic had
92. Thomas Cottier et al., The Principle of Common Concern and Climate Change,
52 A.V.R. 293, 297–298, 301–302 (2014) (“In the international law discourse, Common
Concern is generally discussed as distinct from the doctrine of common heritage of mankind
[ . . . ]. Yet, its role and contents have not been clarified. It has been discussed as a potential
foundation of a human right to the environment. While often limited to environmental law,
the concept has also been put forward as a foundation for international human rights
protection in general[, but] its relationships to public goods and to other legal principles
have not been explored[, included vis-à-vis tangible heritage . . . ]. Recourse to Common
Concern both in the literature and in treaty language suggests that it stands for the
proposition of a shared problem and shared responsibility, and for an issue which reaches
beyond the bounds of a single community and [S]tate as a subject of international law. [. . .
In any case,] Common Concern does not fundamentally alter the paradigms of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources and of territoriality. But it may modify jurisdictional
boundaries in assuming enhanced and shared responsibilities among [S]tates.”).
93. See, e.g., Riccardo Vecellio Segate, Reconceptualising Musical Treasures in
Italy, the EU and the World: The Functional Legacy of Performativity, 24 ART ANTIQUITY
& L. 199, 209 (2019).
94. KAROLINA KUPRECHT, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ CULTURAL PROPERTY CLAIMS:
REPATRIATION AND BEYOND 42 (2014).
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to face unexpected floods. [. . .] But climate change can do more
than flooding a territory, including museums and collections.
From a legal perspective, it could go as far as cancelling a territory
which is one of the constitutive elements of a State. [. . .] Any
cultural property still on the territory would self-evidently no
longer be legally protected by national legislation nor by
international law […].95
The same Author observed that at the time they were negotiated, most
UNESCO-sponsored intergovernmental binding instruments were not
ready to identify climate change as a key future challenge, and this might
explain the lack of specific commitments to preserving cultural heritage
from climate change-related threats.96 He also argues it is common sense
for States to read the relevant Conventions in light of current trends,97 yet
he fails to acknowledge that an international legal order is in place exactly
for avoiding risky overreliance on States’ “common sense,” which far too
often derails from the common good to seek short-term political gains
instead. Moreover, most States do not have the means to act sua sponte,98
as they are traversed by civil conflicts which intensify climate-change
dangers by multiplying the sources of instability. The case of Mali is
exemplary in this respect; terrorist contempt to monuments has already
been addressed and satisfactorily described by—inter alia—the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)99 and
the International Criminal Court (“ICC”),100 yet such terrorist attacks act in
combination with environmental forces:
the three mosques of Djingareyber, Sankoré and Sidi Yahia
in Timbuktu, Mali [. . .], bear testimony to the physical and social
95. Guido Carducci, What Consideration is Given to Climate and to Climate Change
in the UNESCO Cultural Heritage and Property Conventions?, CLIMATE CHANGE AS A
THREAT TO PEACE: IMPACTS ON CULTURAL HERITAGE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 129, 130
(Sabine von Schorlemer and Sylvia Maus eds., 2014).
96. Id. at 137.
97. Id. at 139.
98. Indeed, even Art.5 WHC contains progressive rather than absolute obligations,
in line with the general phrasing of economic, social and cultural rights in public
international law. Chechi, supra note 52, at 187–188.
99. See Serge Brammertz et al., Attacks against Cultural Heritage as a Weapon of War:
Prosecutions at the ICTY, 14(5) J. OF INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1143, 1168 (2016).
100. See Derek Fincham, Intentional Destruction and Spoliation of Cultural
Heritage Under International Criminal Law, 23 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 149, 183–
88 (2017); Karolina Wierczyńska and Andrzej Jakubowski, Individual Responsibility for
Deliberate Destruction of Cultural Heritage: Contextualizing the ICC Judgment in the AlMahdi Case, 16 CHIN. J. INT. LAW 695 (2017); Yaron Gottlieb, Attacks Against Cultural
Heritage as a Crime Against Humanity, Case Western Reserve Journal of International
Law, 52 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 287 (2020).
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impacts of climate change (desertification). On the one hand,
projected changes show that in the future the area of Timbuktu
will face a decrease in average rainfall and an increase in
atmospheric temperature, which will surely contribute to desert
encroachment and sand blown damage. Another climate factor
that deserves attention is the increase in extreme precipitation
events. Heavy rains in 1999, 2001 and 2003 damaged or caused
the collapse of traditional earthen buildings and mud mosques.
Moreover, the desertification in the region of Timbuktu is an
important source of stress to the three mosques because it might
lead the migration of the local population, including the local
craftsmen, which are involved in the restoration process of the
mud structures of the mosques.101
The WHC is regrettably fraught with loopholes: first, the State where
a listed heritage in danger is located (“primary State”) bears primary but
not exclusive responsibility over its protection;102 second, the
complimentary protection of other States may enter into play only under
consent of and upon request by the primary State;103 third, all those “other
States” are obliged not to deliberately violate such heritage,104 whilst might
do so “accidentally.” These formulations result in the fact that no State—
neither the primary one, nor the others—bears unqualified obligations to
protect cultural heritage: the obligations of the primary State are nonexclusive and dependent on its resources, those of the others can go
unfulfilled whenever the primary State does not permit foreign
interferences and whenever damaging actions are not voluntary. The
“international community” has no right to intervene, either, 105 although it
might well have residual legal interests to protect. As such, a more
contemporary reading of the Convention is not enough: this instrument
needs to be rewritten substantially; it is the epitome of a treaty whose high
compliance rates indicate weakness (of the treaty requirements) rather than
effectiveness (in the accomplishment of its purpose).106

101. Chechi, supra note 52, at 167. The last sentence from this quotation also
unearths the delicate interrelationship between the tangible (mosques) and intangible
(artisanship) expressions of the same heritage.
102. 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention, supra, note 53, at Art.4.
103. Id. at Art.6(2).
104. Id. at Art.6(3).
105. Roger Michael O'Keefe, World Cultural Heritage: Obligations to the
International Community as a Whole?, 53 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 189 (2004).
106. Edward J. Goodwin, The World Heritage Convention, the Environment, and
Compliance, 20 COLO. J. INT’L ENVT. L. & POL’Y 157, 189 (2009).
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Other instruments related to broad interpretations of human rights
treaties are more and more invoked too, often unsuccessfully;107 however,
said mechanisms do “not allow either the protection of the environment per
se nor an ordinary compensation of the damage caused to the
environment.”108 This is why, from a doctrinal viewpoint, even seeking to
protect cultural heritage by recourse to environmental law might not
necessarily suffice, unless it is clearly argued that the damage to a
monument—similarly to that to an ecosystem—constitutes a violation of
legal rights held by specifically identifiable individuals or collective
groups.109 In the cultural heritage field, though, pleading successfully is
even harder: in the Ahunbay case, the Court in fact confuted the existence
of an individual right to cultural heritage preservation,110 and nothing would
have changed if the site were a UNESCO-listed one; the dam was delayed
because of legal claims submitted by NGOs and sponsors framing the issue
in environmental terms (even though the prospected flooding of that
heritage would have been artificially caused),111 exactly because the
cultural-heritage protection framework is legally flawed.112 Claims erga

107. See Ottavio Quirico, Jürgen Bröhmer, & Marcel Szabó, Linking trade and
climate change: What room for human rights?, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVE 7, 25 (Ottavio Quirico and Mouloud
Boumghar, eds, 2016); Ottavio Quirico, Systemic integration: Between climate change and
human rights in international law?, 35 NETH. Q. HUM. RIGHTS 31 (2017); BRIDGET LEWIS,
ENVIRONMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE
PROSPECTS (2018); KEN CONCA, AN UNFINISHED FOUNDATION: THE UNITED NATIONS AND
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 119–147 (2015); Alan Boyle, Climate Change, the
Paris Agreement and Human Rights, 67 INT. COMP. LAW Q. 759 (2018).
108. Sandrine Maljean-Dubois, International Litigation and State Liability for
Environmental Damages: Recent Evolutions and Perspectives, CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY
AND BEYOND 27, 47 (Jiunn-rong Yeh [台大法律系] ed., 2017).
109. Horatia Muir Watt, Private International Law beyond the Schism, 2
TRANSNAT'L LEGAL THEORY 347, 388 (2011) (“Especially in Europe, where private
international law claims arising out of transboundary pollution of monuments benefit from
«the EC Rome II Regulation, which ensures by means of an option opened for the claimant
that the most compensatory—and therefore the most pollution-repellent—law will apply.”).
110. Zeynep Ahunbay et al. v. Turkey, App No. 6080/06 HUDOC (Jan. 29, 2019),
https://perma.cc/DXY2-W3E9. An essential summary can be found at https://perma.cc
/7ECG-ZUCL.
111. Kanchana Wangkeo, Monumental Challenges: The Lawfulness of Destroying
Cultural Heritage During Peacetime, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 183, 233–235 (2003).
112. See generally Sarah Mason-Case, On being companions and strangers:
Lawyers and the production of international climate law, 32 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 625 (2019)
(transnational networks of environmental lawyers are more active and organised compared
to cultural-heritage ones, thus proving more effective in both lawyering per se and
lobbying); see also Pascal Olivier Girot, The Darien Region Between Colombia and
Panama: Gap or Seal?, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CONFLICTS AND NORMS IN
A GLOBALIZING WORLD 172, 190 (Lyuba Zarsky ed., 2002) (example of combined
environmental-heritage mobilisation).
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omnes113 need to be substantiated with evidence that the damaged site was
considered of universally outstanding value for the artistic memory of
mankind. And even so, as demonstrated by further leading case-law, it is
extremely arduous to enforce a supposedly universal legal entitlement to
protect certain goods or sites:114 a decision issued by the German Federal
Constitutional Court in 2007115 regarding the Elbe Valley proves these
difficulties at their best, insofar as a WHL site was endangered by a
dismissive street consultation and no public institution in Germany proved
able to comply with the State’s obligations under the 1972 Convention.116
No liability of Germany for this mismanagement was established before the
“international community,” the only consequence being the dropping of the
site from the List117 (which simply spirals a vicious circle of nonprotection).118 When a WHC site is listed as “in danger”, the best the
Convention allows for is a relatively small contribution towards adaptation
costs for adjusting policies;119 as such, no compensation is provided: neither
by third countries (e.g., major world polluters) to the primary State for the
negative repercussions of climate change, nor by the primary State to the
“international community” when the damage occurs domestically (e.g.,
because of negligence in exercising due diligence). This notwithstanding,
in a few occasions the political blaming which accompanies a site’s
(forthcoming) registration on the List of World Heritage in Danger does
trigger wiser decision-making from governmental authorities, like with the
case of Lake Baikal and a pipeline rerouting across Siberia.120 As for the
Special Climate Change Fund established by the Conference of the Parties

113. See Alessandro Chechi, Risks Relating to the Protection of Cultural Heritage:
From Climate Change to Disasters, LEGAL RISKS IN EU LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES
ON LEGAL RISK MANAGEMENT AND BETTER REGULATION IN EUROPE 199, 218 (Emilia
Mišćenić, Aurélien Raccah eds., 2016).
114. Andrzej Jakubowski, Resolution 2347: Mainstreaming the protection of
cultural heritage at the global level, 48 QUEST. INTL. L. 21, 26 (2018).
115. Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 695/07, (Decision of May 8, 2007).
116. Christian J. Tams, Addendum to the “Cultural Heritage of Mankind” Entry, A
CONCISE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS 50, 51 (Helmut Volger, ed. 2nd ed,
2010).
117. Caroline Y. Robertson, Cultural Heritage of Mankind” Entry, SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: RELATIONSHIPS TO CULTURE, KNOWLEDGE AND ETHICS 175, 183–184
(Oliver Parodi, Ignacio Avestaran, Gerhard Banse eds., 2011); see Battini, supra note 13, at
356–357.
118. See Diana Zacharias, Cologne Cathedral versus Skyscrapers – World Heritage
Protection as Archetype of a Multilevel System, 10 MAX PLANCK UNYB 273, 318–322
(2006) (on the removal of properties from the WHL).
119. RODA VERHEYEN, CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
PREVENTION DUTIES AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY 217 (2005).
120. See Battini, supra note 13, at 354–355.
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to the UNFCCC and also covering adaptation costs,121 it seems prima facie
inapplicable to cultural heritage and is anyway limited to assisting
developing countries.
II.4 Coupling enemies: regulatory compliance and
wartime overfocus
When harm occurs notwithstanding compliance with relevant
regulations, inter-regime (i.e. based on both environmental law and cultural
heritage law) submissions are important also because court shields often
come from “regulatory compliance defence” and evidentiary challenges
related thereto,122 which may involve either domestic or international
regulations and foster instances of “regime shopping.” Acceptance of this
defence by international/domestic courts depends on several factors, e.g.,
on whether the regulation at hand was a “standard” or a proper law (e.g.,
administrative order);
[t]he idea is that the administrative authority, when granting
a licence and setting permit conditions, cannot take into account
the possible harm that the licenced activity might cause to all
possible third parties. […] Meeting the conditions of a permit is
just a minimum. A plant owner has to take all possible precautions
as required by tort law in order to avoid causing harm to third
parties through his licensed activity. [Moreover,] the nonresponsibility of a [S]tate based on the fact that it complied with
international law is without prejudice to its liability under
domestic law, or to the liability of private actors that may have
acted in compliance with standards based on the international
agreement. [Similarly, but to the opposite effect,] when the rule of
international law on which the claim is based is incorporated in
domestic law, it does retain its international character.123
These considerations would obviously sound too risky and
unpredictable for any entrepreneur to run a business, which is why too
many environmental cases are still settled amicably (i.e. extrajudicially) by
121. Global Environment Facility Council, GEF/C.24/12 (Oct. 15, 2004),
Programming to implement the Guidance for the Special Climate Change Fund adopted by
the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change at its Ninth Session, ¶ 17(a), 40–57, https://perma.cc/B8BX-CEXL.
122. Jutta Brunnee, Of Sense and Sensibility: Reflections on International Liability
Regimes as Tools for Environmental Protection, 53 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 351, 354 (2004).
123. André Nollkaemper, Cluster-litigation in cases of transboundary
environmental harm, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY: LEGAL
REMEDIES FOR TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION 11, 26–27, 32 (Michael G. Faure, Song Ying,
eds., 2008).
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applying equitable criteria for redressing a caused damage without
incurring in other legal consequences.
Another limit that makes the application of international liability
schemes taxing in practice is the overfocus of relevant international laws
on conflict situations.124 This is a long-standing bias in China, too:
There is one great law to protect [the patrimony]. In times of
military invasion, the people from other countries cannot take or
destroy it. Those who destroy it can be forced to make
reparations. This is called international law.125
Yet, the most telling example is that when UNESCO was founded, its
primary mission was identified in post-war reconstruction and
rehabilitation,126 such a legacy producing consequences still today. “The
drafters of the World Heritage Convention actually deleted the phrase “in
time of peace” from the agreement.”127 Differently from that of the
environment,128 the protection of cultural heritage suffers from an
unbalanced emphasis placed on wartime instruments129 and, within the

124. See Christopher Greenwood, State Responsibility and Civil Liability for
Environmental Damage Caused by Military Operations, 69 INT. LAW STUD. 397, 397–415
(1996), for an overview of these laws.
125. Translated excerpt from a letter by the entrepreneur Zhāng Jiǎn [张謇] to some
of his Chinese friends, dated approximately 1890, as reported in Lisa Claypool, Zhang Jian
and China’s First Museum, 64 J. ASIAN STUD. 567, 570 (2005).
126. MIRIAM INTRATOR, BOOKS ACROSS BORDERS: UNESCO AND THE POLITICS OF
POSTWAR CULTURAL RECONSTRUCTION, 1945–1951, 2–6 (2019).
127. Wangkeo, supra note 111, at 200.
128. Mansour Jabbari-Gharabagh, Legal Perspectives for the Protection of the
Environment Against the Effects of Military Activities During International Armed Conflict,
PhD thesis (Université Laval, 1997) 94, https://perma.cc/44ZY-CH7T; see Arie Afriansyah,
State Responsibility for Environmental Damage during International Armed Conflict Post
the UNCC, 10 INDONESIAN J. INT'L L 377 (2013); see also Arie Afriansyah, The Adequacy
of International Legal Obligations for Environmental Protection during Armed Conflict, 3
INDON. L. REV. 55 (2013). The UN International Law Commission, https://perma.cc/3ETB8NKX (see the outcomes and proceedings of their work); Bernard K. Schafer, The
Relationship between the International Laws of Armed Conflict and Environmental
Protection: The Need to Reevaluate What Types of Conduct Are Permissible during
Hostilities, 19 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 287 (1989) (to trace the development of the law through a
military prism, referring to this less recent analysis might be of interest).
129. See generally Caitlin V. Hill, Killing a Culture: The Intentional Destruction of
Cultural Heritage in Iraq and Syria under International Law, 45 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
191 (2016); DAVID JAMES BEDERMAN, GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 120 (1st
ed. 2008); David Keane, The Failure to Protect Cultural Property in Wartime, 14 DEPAUL
J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2004). Interestingly, framing massive destruction of
cultural heritage in environmental law terms might prove convenient even in terms of
“responsibility to protect”, as the latter can be invoked for environmental crimes, whilst it
appears difficult to argue it would be invokable for damage to cultural heritage per se.
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humanitarian context, on the distinction between military and non-military
targets.130 Besides UNESCO131 and non-UNESCO132 declarations,
conflict-centred binding provisions include the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict, but also, more recently, the 2017 UN Security
Council Resolution 2347 and the “semi-binding” UN General Assembly
(“UNGA”) Resolution 2199 on Iraq, in 2015.
However, at least with regard to gross violations of the
international obligation to respect cultural heritage—such as the
intentional destruction of monuments of universal importance—
it seems that an opinio juris as to their unlawful character also in
peace time is emerging. This is witnessed by the world-wide
condemnation of the acts of destruction by the Taliban of the
great Buddha of Bamyam in 2001. It is confirmed by the […]
resolve that has led to the unanimous adoption in 2003 of the
UNESCO Declaration Concerning Intentional Destruction of
Cultural Heritage. This declaration is an instrument of soft
law.133
The reader must have noticed that the stakes remain very high: the
destruction must be intentional, and the applicable monuments are only

130. E.g., Patty Gerstenblith, The Destruction of Cultural Heritage: A Crime Against
Property or a Crime Against People, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L., 336, 365–367
(2016).
131. Such as the 2015 Saint Petersburg Declaration on the Protection of Culture in
the Areas of Armed Conflicts.
132. Like the 2016 Abu Dhabi Declaration on Heritage at Risk in the Context of
Armed Conflicts, promoted by ICOSMO.
133. Francesco Francioni, Beyond State Sovereignty: The Protection of Cultural
Heritage as a Shared Interest of Humanity, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L., 1209, 1219 (2004).
Notably, Art.2(1) of this Declaration provides for the protection of “cultural heritage linked
to a natural site.”
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those whose universal importance is acknowledged.134 Regionally, luckily,
the threshold may be significantly lower; this is the case in Europe, where
the scope135 of the 2017 CoE Convention on Offences relating to Cultural
Property “merges” those of the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention
and the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property, thus including both movable and immovable objects and
disapplying any distinction between armed conflicts and peacetime.
Unfortunately, the international community seems not yet ready to uphold
comparably wide stances at the global level, and the CoE Convention itself
was ratified by Cyprus and Mexico only – the second ratifier should not
surprise insofar as the Convention is open to non-Council members too,
mostly by invitation.136 In sum, this Convention has not yet entered into
force, and arguably several decades will go by before it achieves substantial
consensus, if ever; meanwhile, heritage under siege due to environmental
reasons cannot wait, which is why a recourse to environmental legal tools
is rendered unavoidable. What is more, the Convention provides for
sanctions and criminal penalties without designing a proper liability regime
for damages whose individual dolus or state responsibility cannot be
ascertained.

134. See Ayman Abdel Tawar, The Assessment of Historic Towns’ Outstanding
Universal Value Based on the Interchange of Human Values They Exhibit, 2 HERITAGE 1874
(2019) (explaining the current and potential criteria for insulating universally valuable
heritage from “the rest”); Kati Lindström, Universal heritage value, community identities
and world heritage: Forms, functions, processes and context at a changing Mt Fuji, 44
LANDSC RES. 278 (2019); Patrick R. Patiwael, Peter Groote, Frank Vanclay, Improving
heritage impact assessment: An analytical critique of the ICOMOS guidelines, 25 INT. J.
HERITAGE STUD. 333 (2019); Alice Palmer, Legal Dimensions to Valuing Aesthetics in
World Heritage Decisions, 26(5) SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 581 (2017); see also Lynn Meskell,
Claudia Liuzza, Enrico Bertacchini, Donatella Saccone, Multilateralism and UNESCO
World Heritage: Decision-making, States Parties and political processes, 21 INT. J.
HERITAGE STUD. 1 (2015) (on the politics underpinning the List’s inscriptions); Enrico
Bertacchini, Claudia Liuzza, Lynn Meskell, Donatella Saccone, The politicization of
UNESCO World Heritage decision making, 176 PUBLIC CHOICE 95 (2016) (“Universality”
is sometimes recognised only after reconstruction of demolished heritage, as its value lies
in the testimony of post-war rebuilding and possibly reconciliation); see Harold Kalman,
Destruction, mitigation, and reconciliation of cultural heritage, 23(6) INT’L J. HERITAGE
STUDIES 538, 543 (2017).
135. Council of Europe Convention on Offenses relating to Cultural Property, art.
2(a), 2(b), May 19, 2017.
136. Id. at art.27(1); 28(1); see also Explanatory Report, at ¶ 149, https://perma.
cc/7Z6Z-WZXX.
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II.5 From the environment to culture, and back
The previous sections demonstrated that protecting cultural heritage
by recourse to IEL may help, but it is not free from loopholes, as the latter
field is still embryonical. Bearing this in mind, what other practical
elements of IEL may cultural heritage law draw inspiration from? First,
several soft-law instruments drafted by the United Nations Environment
Programme (“UNEP”) establish international environmental impact
assessment’s “soft obligations,” by calling for issuing environmental
impact assessments (“EIAs”) before executing all projects likely to
significantly impact the environment, where such an environment is
understood in a comprehensive fashion as to incorporate cultural practices
and monuments.137 Even the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), that protects also cultural heritage,138 might be
deemed to implicitly suggest the adoption of EIAs.139 The existence of
EIAs is one of the key reasons why cultural heritage protection should be
incorporated in the environmental law regime or framed in environmental
protection language; indeed, no comparable procedure exists for the
prevention of negative impact on cultural heritage internationally, and in
any respect, the combined effects of the two harms would be more
persuasive arguing. Cases where ex ante assessments of potential
perilousness have proven decisive are uncountable, and cultural heritage
protection usually succeeds when it forms part of EIAs-resulting objection
claims. In Europe, the case of the rejected construction of the hydroelectric
power plant “Buk-Bijela” between Serbia and Montenegro represents an
enlightening example of transboundary occurrence shaped by strategic
environmental assessments, whose outcome was the preservation of the
UNESCO-protected “Durmitor” National Park along the Tara River.140
The same can be affirmed with regards to countless other loci amoeni, such
as the ancient Albanian port city of Durrës, displaying vestiges from the
Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman dominations; there, it proved “useful for
both policy and practical purposes to consider cultural heritage protection

137. ALASTAIR NEIL CRAIK, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT: PROCESS, SUBSTANCE AND INTEGRATION 133–141 (1st ed. 2008)(With
reference to the US, the amended National Environmental Policy Act, at §101[b](2,4),
provides that “[t]he Federal government use all practicable means [. . .] to assure for all
Americans safe, healthful, productive and aesthetically and culturally pleasant
surroundings [. . . and to] preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of [their]
national heritage.”) (emphasis added).
138. Arts. 149; 303.
139. Gerd Winter, International Principles of Marine Environmental Protection,
HANDBOOK ON MARINE ENVIRONMENT: PROTECTION SCIENCE, IMPACTS AND SUSTAINABLE
MANAGEMENT 585, 599 (Markus Salomon & Till Markus eds., 2018).
140. See Kalezić, supra note 42, at 220–224.
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law not as a separate concept but as an integral part of environmental law
as a whole.”141
Along similar rails, cultural heritage protection claims succeeded
when pleaded jointly with environmental considerations in leading
arbitration cases:
[i]n Glamis Gold (2009) […], the ICSID tribunal rejected the
claim of a Canadian company that the stringent regulations
adopted at the federal and state levels on the conduct of mining
operations in California would amount to indirect expropriation
and breach of legitimate expectations of the foreign investor. The
cultural value of the mining site as ancestral land of a tribal
community of Native Americans, together with compelling
environmental considerations, was a factor in support of the
legitimacy of the regulatory measures imposed by the United
States’ authorities in view of protecting the environment and
landscape value of the relevant territory.142
This aligns with the linkages between energy and the environment,
witnessing virtually no claim submitted to the Permanent Court of
Arbitration for purely environmental matters and yet incorporating
environmental chapters (e.g., on environmental sustainability or remedies
for environmental damage) as a substantial argument of energy
submissions.143
The concept of in dubio pro natura—spillovering terminologically
(yet reversed conceptually) from the in dubio pro reo adjudicating rationale
in criminal trials—has been recognised as a valid principle of
environmental law in several civil liability cases all around the world;144
coherently, one might make the case for an in dubio pro monumento145 (or
in dubio pro cultura) principle in cultural heritage law.
As for the reverse, that is, environmental protection by means of
cultural heritage provisions, corporations can lay the foundations of more
141. Helga Turku, Cultural Property, Human Rights, and Sustainable Development:
The Case of the Ancient City of Durres, 25 HASTINGS ENVT’L L.J. 121, 138 (2019).
142. Francioni, supra note 49, at 19 (emphasis added).
143.See Tamar Meshel, Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural
Resources and/or the Environment: Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURAL LAW [MPEiPro] § 15 (2016).
144. Yann Aguila, Jorge Enrique Viñuales, A Global Pact for the Environment:
Conceptual Foundations, A GLOBAL PACT FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: LEGAL FOUNDATIONS 12,
18 n.44 (Yann Aguila, Jorge Enrique Viñuales eds., 2019).
145. George Suetonio Ramalho, A tutela jurídica do patrimônio histórico e cultural:
O exemplo do Centro Histórico de João Pessoa 49 (2016) (MSc thesis, Universidade
Católica De Santos); Fabiana Santos Dantas, O direito fundamental à memória 75 (2008)
(PhD thesis, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco)
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grounded client bases via adding the non-profit dimension of protecting
cultural heritage, whose preservation yields the safety of consumers’
feelings of belonging and sense of roots; this “trust capital” spills over
environmental protection up to ensuring the sustainable development of
and “fidelity” to the business. Such a process is profitable, as enterprises
are increasingly realising that profit must be guided by “the accumulation
of institutional, relational, moral and spiritual capital in society as
constituent parts of their total impact on social capital.”146 Any publicprivate partnership based on trust cannot neglect liability schemes designed
to cater for prompt and full restoration and compensation in the event of
environmental and/or cultural damage.
III. International legal framework on (environmental) liability of
States
Although international (personal and state) liability remains
understudied, it represents an essential redress mechanism in
environmental and cultural heritage law: in these fields, international
responsibility is a device of declaratory normative effect, yet it often
provides no satisfactory risk-shifting and cost-allocation strategy portfolio
for countries to rely upon. Damnum infectum est damnum nondum factum,
quod futurum veremur.147 Redress should compensate for both pecuniary
and non-pecuniary losses, whenever applicable. Time-wise, it might either
account for the passing of time (beyond the elementary restoration of the
status quo ante, provided that restoration is even achievable), or result from
less expensive cost-effectiveness calculations when the worth of the
damaged heritage would not significantly exceed the costs for its
restoration. Furthermore, reparation should take into account social costs
(such as community dispersion, cultural displacement, group identity
alienation), to be identified against the backdrop of wider implications for
indigenous communities’ livelihood as well as their coping and adaptation
capabilities (drawing on the language of the Paris Agreement). Additional
cost items may originate in the touristic value of the damaged site/tradition
(for instance, as a share of the annual average of the local GDP), in other
developmental considerations, and in the economic equivalence of the
future potential legitimate exploitation of said site/tradition that the
population concerned would have put in place would the damage not have
been perpetrated.

146. Michael Pollitt, Green Values in Communities: How and Why to Engage
Individuals with Decarbonization Targets, GREEN BUSINESS, GREEN VALUES, AND
SUSTAINABILITY 67, 77 (Christos N. Pitelis et al. eds., 2011).
147. Nuclear Test (Australia v. France), Judgment, 1974, I.C.J. 389 (Dec. 20, 1975)
(de Castro, J., dissenting).
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The rationales supporting the case for liability application might vary
widely:148 liability can function as an economic incentive for compliance
with environmental obligations; as a sanction regime for damaging—yet
not internationally wrongful—conduct; as a corrective mechanism to
restore environmental assets to their previous conditions; and as a
Pigouvian strategy against the externalisation of a State’s hazardous
environmental choices. Specularly, it could work for internalising
environmental, social, and insurance costs into production processes, this
way implementing the polluter-pays principle (a flagship norm for the EU)
and functioning as a post-damage or parametric risk-pooling factor.149 But
it is not only a strictly legal matter: framing cultural heritage claims against
liability schemes employed in environmental affairs allows one to grasp the
underlying goals of rhetorical devices used in politics across multiple
fields. Curiously, not even the crafting of soft norms such as the 1972
Stockholm Declaration150 was deemed appropriate a mechanism for
reaching consensus over detailed liability rules, implying they would be
better left to case-by-case political adjustment between the parties.151
Moreover, the same Declaration does not expressively refer to either
natural or cultural heritage: only the former was indirectly referred to in
Principle 4, satisfying a request advanced by the Indian delegates.152
III.1 Forms of liability and related terminological uncertainties
Two inextricable elements constitute the cause of action of
State liability: the objective element materialized through the
violation of an international rule (the wrongful act), and the
subjective element, made of the linkage which relies this wrongful
act to its author State (the causal link). The objective element
148. See also UNGA, Report of the UN Secretary-General on the “Gaps in
international environmental law and environment-related instruments: Towards a global
pact for the environment,” UN Doc. A/73/419 (Nov. 30, 2018) ¶ 94.
149. See Morten Broberg, Parametric loss and damage insurance schemes as a
means to enhance climate change resilience in developing countries, 20 CLIM. POL. 693,
694–696 (2020) (explaining the difference between parametric and post-damage riskpooling insurance criteria).
150. See Günther Handl, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration), 1972 and the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, 1992, United Nations Audiovisual Library of International
Law (2012), https://perma.cc/47A5-BE8U (succinct expert commentary).
151. BHARAT H. DESAI, MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: LEGAL
STATUS OF THE SECRETARIATS 28–29 (2010).
152. Catherine Redgwell, The International Law of Public Participation: Protected
Areas, Endangered Species, and Biological Diversity, HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATURAL
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF
MINING AND ENERGY RESOURCES 187, 191 n.18. (Donald N. Zillman, Alastair R. Lucas,
George Pring eds., 2002).
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consists thus of the violation of an international rule. However, in
certain hypotheses, States can bear responsibility for injurious
consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international
law; this phenomenon is commonly called liability without fault,
for risk or objective liability. Such regimes are well known in
domestic law, but the international sphere remains almost
unaffected by them. The works of the International Law
Commission have not been conclusive on this point. There is no
principle in international customary law on such an objective State
liability, including for environmental damages. There is only one
Convention that provides for such a regime of objective
international liability, namely the Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects. To allow better
reparation of environmental damages, around fifteen international
conventions have developed regimes of objective liability but by
shifting the responsibility on operators (managers and owners),
thus drifting from public to private international law.153
In sum, the forms in which liability presents itself are: state liability
only; civil liability with residual state liability; and civil liability only. The
first can be further divided in three categories: subjective, objective (or
strict), and absolute liability. The first category concerns acts performed
by the State, of which the latter is intentionally responsible, and it stands as
a corollary of international responsibility; the second refers to acts
performed by the State unwillingly, e.g., by being negligent; the third
proceeds so far as to cover acts not performed directly by the States and yet
occurred resulting in damages vis-à-vis third parties, where it was not
explicitly obvious the State should have exercised appreciable degrees of
oversight.
However, there is no perfect alignment in academic literature on these
sorting criteria. Admittedly, there are several scholarly traditions whose
views on this issue diverge both conceptually and linguistically: liability is
first a device of domestic (administrative and private) law, which is later
“stretched” to acquire international applicability, and this enucleates the
divergence between scholars on both substance and terminology. The justmentioned three typologies of liability have been rephrased in literature, for
example, as follows:
fault (negligence), strict liability (there is a presumption of
responsibility but defenses are available), and absolute liability
(no cause of justification is possible, and a [S]tate would be liable
even for an act of God). While fault is based on due diligence,
153.

Maljean-Dubois, supra note 108, at 32–33.
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strict and absolute liability impose responsibility for acts not
prohibited under international law. Strict liability emphasizes the
harm rather than the conduct. It is a widespread opinion that
international law lacks absolute or strict liability as a general rule.
[…] For example, strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities can
be considered a general principle of law since it is found in
municipal legislation worldwide. Some treaties even support
absolute liability for these activities. However, strict or absolute
liability is more difficult to impute for activities that are not
ultrahazardous. 154
One further way to interpret state liabilities is that none involves fault;
as per this view, both strict and absolute liability are objective liabilities
insofar as subjective ones are only arguable in international criminal law as
far as individuals (heads of State, ministers, plus other public officials) are
concerned. Under this interpretation, too, looking at environmental law is
the wiser option to seek compensation for damages to cultural heritage, as
domestic experiences like the Brazilian one started to demonstrate.155
Another issue is that, not rarely, “liable” and “responsible” are even
used interchangeably,156 whereas instead international liability and
international responsibility are truly different concepts.157 The latter is
triggered by a state breach of a primary rule jointly with the attribution of
such a breach; the second entails either a monetary redress following
responsibility (absolute liability) or a payment ex gratia for non-wrongful
yet attributed or attributable acts (strict liability). There exists a further
distinction between direct and vicarious responsibility, which comes into
play when private actors’ violations are culpably not prevented by the State,
which only bears relevance domestically. For example, with reference to
the US, a study concluded that regarding
the question of whether environmental liability should be
deterred through a negligence or a strict liability rule, […] the
policy maker should […] introduce strict liability for
environmental pollution, [provided] that if a serious insolvency
risk exists, the introduction of strict liability [is] accompanied with

154. Max Valverde Soto, General Principles of International Environmental Law, 3
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 193, 203 (1996) (emphasis added).
155. Ana Maria Moreira Marchesan, A Tutela Do Patrimônio Cultural Sob O
Enfoque Do Direito Ambiental: Uma Abordagem Transdisciplinar 277–78 (2006)
(unpublished LLM Thesis, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina).
156. E.g., Morten Broberg, Interpreting the UNFCCC’s provisions on “mitigation”
and “adaptation” in light of the Paris Agreement’s provision on “loss and damage,” 20
CLIM. POL. 527, 529 (2020).
157. See generally N.L.J.T. Horbach, The Confusion About State Responsibility and
International Liability, 4 LEIDEN J. INT’L. L. 47 (1991).
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solvency guarantees, such as the introduction of compulsory
insurance. Otherwise, strict liability may exactly have the effect
of driving polluters to reduce the assets that are exposed to
liability.158
All in all, primary rules at the international level should always spell
out clearly what the expectations are in terms of state duties to prevent, as
well as the demarcation between obligations of conduct and of result, as to
avoid confusion and unevenness of claims between international lawyers
and practitioners from different jurisdictions. Terminological uncertainties
go the extra mile also with regards to the classes of remedies159 resulting
from different unlawful or otherwise illicit behaviour.160 At any rate, this
article concerns itself with explaining why cultural heritage should be
protected in combination with the environment, why state liability is a
necessary device to uphold such protection, and why China is a central
actor to watch in order to track and retrace the trends in this respect. A
thorough systematisation of this confusion on questions of classes and
theories in liability regimes falls outside the aspirations of the present study.
Claims of state liability can be submitted before national courts and
tribunals, before international courts and tribunals,161 or directly to relevant
state officials for political resolution. These claims can be thus settled
diplomatically (through mediation and negotiation) or judicially (through
litigation and arbitration),162 with mixed results in terms of normative
impact on the future conduct of States. As for China, it “has more than
sixty environmental chambers in fourteen courts in Provinces, for hearing

158. Michael Faure, Effectiveness of Environmental Law: What Does the Evidence
Tell Us?, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 293, 303–304 (2012) (emphasis added).
159. For example: reparation, compensation, restoration, retribution, redress,
recovery, injunctive relief, remedy, penalty, fine, indemnification.
160. For example: nuisance, damage, injury, destruction, harm, mistreatment, tort,
fault, crime.
161. Nevertheless, potential criminal options (which would support e.g., evidence
gathering) against top officials are not available, as the ICC non-parties are the very same
top polluters (China and the US in the first place). On the (propounded, but apparently later
aborted) “environmental turn” of the ICC, see Olesya Dovgalyuk & Riccardo Vecellio
Segate, From Russia and beyond: The ICC global standing, while countries’ resignation is
getting serious, FiloDiritto, 18 (2017), https://perma.cc/J9EX-HDS3.
162. Refer e.g., to the 2001 PCA Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating
to the Environment and/or Natural Resources, under which individuals and other non-state
entities may file a claim concerning other States’ violation of environmental and natural
resources. Still, this does not fill the gap about the actio popularis which could trigger
proceedings regarding global (rather than transnational) environmental claims. Famous
arbitration cases which shaped the course of international environmental law are Trail
Smelter (United States v Canada), 3 U.N. Reports of International Arbitral Awards (1938
and 1941); and Lac Lanoux (France v Spain), 12 U.N. Reports of International Arbitral
Awards (1957).
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citizen complaints against polluters;”163 pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), the Chinese
public administration can be sued, too,164 which is a strong signal of
authoritarianisation of state power rather than of its weakening.165 Subject
to an anything-but-obvious state consent, relying on domestic courts for the
enforcement of state liability clauses (and transboundary environmental
law more generally) bears one obvious advantage and one equally obvious
disadvantage: the chance to ensure the bindingness of the judgements, and
the risk of further fragmenting a fast-paced legal field which is already
moving in uncoordinated directions.166
Furthermore, a distinction shall be operated between issues of climate
change and transboundary pollution. Assuming the existence of States A
to G, four typologies of cases are foreseeable: transboundary (damage to
e.g., A and B, with A or B starting it by damaging themselves first),
international unilateral (damage e.g., from A to B), international bilateral
(mutual damage between A and B and vice versa), international multilateral
(damage e.g., from A to BCDE or from ABC to DEFG or from ABCDE to
G etc.—some multilateral configurations can actually be read as bilateral
instead, for instance when the European Union as a whole is involved), or
global (when all States—or most of them—threaten a “commons” in a
supranational fashion that makes it unfeasible or blatantly unfair to
apportion faults). In each of these cases, the parties have to identify the
(most) competent forum, the source of the applicable liability rules,167 and
the remedies available thereunder.

163. Nicholas A. Robinson, Evolved norms: A canon for the Anthropocene, RULE
OF LAW FOR NATURE: NEW DIMENSIONS AND IDEAS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 46, 70 (Christina
Voigt, ed. 2013); see also Minchum Zhang and Bao Zhang, Specialized Environmental
Courts in China: Status Quo, Challenges and Responses, 30 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES
L. 361 (2012); Rachel E. Stern, The Political Logic of China’s New Environmental Courts,
72 THE CHINA J. 53 (2014).
164. Taisu Zhang & Thomas B. Ginsburg, China’s Turn Toward Law, 59 VA. J. INT'L
L., 280, 310 n.144 (2019).
165. RACHEL E. STERN, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION IN CHINA: A STUDY IN
POLITICAL AMBIVALENCE, 100–104 (2013).
166. TIM STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 78–80
(2009).
167. General principles of transboundary liability in environmental matters;
customary laws; treaties, possibly supplemented by and “operated” through soft norms;
domestic civil law (of which side?); domestic criminal law (of which side?).
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III.2 Liability schemes and environmental principles
Whatever the forum and framework for submission, the elements of
liability which are often argued about in terms of environmental damage168
(especially to cultural heritage) are linked to a variety of principles,
standards, and customary expectations. Some of the most cited are the
polluter-pays principle, the “solidarity” principle, the right to a clean and
healthy environment (quality living), the no-harm principle (substantially
equivalent to the sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas one), and the
“intergenerational equity” principle within the paradigms of
sustainability.169 Whereas some of these principles, functionally employed
as interstitial norms,170 may play a clearer role in shaping judicial responses
to transboundary harm, their applicability to climate-change submissions is
still controversial in both civil- and common-law systems.171
The “common but differentiated responsibility” principle172 holds a
position of prominence for discussions over liability regimes in areas
beyond national jurisdiction(s) or with reference to the global commons,173
for instance regarding climate change:
The proposition that large emitters in the developing world
(such as China, India and Brazil) should accept mandatory
emission reduction targets has revitalized questions of NorthSouth equity and the industrialized countries’ historical
responsibility for the build-up of atmospheric GHG
concentrations. [. . .]
Proposals for more systematic
differentiation on the basis of historic responsibility for elevated
atmospheric GHG concentrations, financial capability to pay for
mitigation measures, intra-national equity among rich and poor

168.See TRAINING MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 50–64 (Lal
Kurukulasuriya & Nicholas A. Robinson eds., 2006) (general introduction to state liability
schemes in IEL).
169. Their most thorough examination is probably accomplished in PHILIPPE SANDS
& JACQUELINE PEEL, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (4th ed. 2018).
170. On environmental principles as interstitial norms, see, most recently, Guillaume
Futhazar, The Normative Nature of the Ecosystem Approach: A Mediterranean Case Study,
TRANSNAT’L ENVTL L. 11–13 (2020).
171. See generally Daniel G. Hare, Blue Jeans, Chewing Gum and Climate Change
Litigation: American Exports to Europe, 29 UTRECHT J. INT. EUR. LAW 65 (2013).
172. See HARRIET BULKELEY AND PETER NEWELL, GOVERNING CLIMATE CHANGE 30
(2010).
173. The discourse on the “commons” is channelled through uneven narratives,
depending on the subject-matters (i.e., the “commons” among cultural heritage expressions,
those among natural environments, etc.).
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social groups, and differentiation between luxury and survival
emissions have therefore surfaced in the debate.174
Whilst the Kyoto approach to this principle distinguished the
responsibilities of the industrialised nations from “the rest,”175 the Paris
Agreement “took a decisive turn away from cross-cutting prescriptive
differentiation towards tailored differentiation,” with different issue-areas
reflecting disparate differentiation criteria (financial capability,
developmental classification, contribution to emissions) as a result of
impervious bargaining between the US and China.176
Another core principle is the precautionary one, references thereto
having been invariably made
(i) to caution against the principle’s “potentially paralysing
effects;” (ii) to assess whether certain measures expressly adopted
on the basis of the precautionary principle are indeed justified
under this principle; (iii) as a stand-alone norm relevant to produce
procedural effects (the reversal of the burden of proof); (iv) as a
stand-alone norm relevant to for the interpretation of an
environmental provision governing a case; (v) as a stand-alone
norm for reviewing of government action; (vi) as a stand-alone
norm creating a positive procedural obligation; (vii) as a standalone norm redefining the parameters of liability (effectively
transforming a fault-based liability system into a strict liability
one); and (viii) as a stand-alone norm requiring the creation of a
new administrative system.177
Other Authors in fact claim that the difference between the
precautionary principle and the polluter-pays one is that the first is
procedural and the second substantive, concerned with burden of proof and
apportionment of costs respectively, although both oriented to the
174. Karin Bäckstrand & Eva Lövbrand, Climate Governance Beyond 2012:
Competing Discourses of Green Governmentality, Ecological Modernization and Civic
Environmentalism, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CLIMATE CHANGE: POWER, KNOWLEDGE,
NORMS, DISCOURSES 123, 137 (Mary E. Pettenger ed., 2007).
175. Kiyotake Morita, Policies Towards Tackling Climate Change and Their
Compatibility with the WTO, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE EU AND
JAPAN 63, 78 (Yumiko Nakanishi ed., 2016); Anne-Sophie Tabau, Climate Change
Compliance Procedures, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURAL
LAW [MPEiPro] § 6 (2019).
176. Lavanya Rajamani, Differentiation, A GLOBAL PACT FOR THE ENVIRONMENT:
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS 167, 170–173 (Aguila, Yann, and Jorge Enrique Viñuales eds., 2019).
177. Aguila, supra note 144, at 18–19 (emphasis added); see also Robyn Eckersley,
Environment rights and democracy, POLITICAL ECOLOGY: GLOBAL AND LOCAL 347, 362
(Roger H. Keil et al. eds., 1998).
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internalisation of environmental costs in industrial production and
commercial choices made by consumers (especially in the Global North).178
Finally, the debate is open as to whether customary obligations to
prevent exist, either under inter-state rules or with regards to the global
commons. One should notice that redressable environmental harms might
be constituted by single acts of pollution or by multiple yet localised acts
of degradation (slow-onset harm); either way, they shall be underpinned by
certainty of relatability (causation). Conversely, probability (correlation)
is what describes the negative effects of climate change as a general
phenomenon in the more abstract and gradual sense. Depending on the
field, the signatories, and the region (when such arrangements are regional),
liability schemes may prescribe a range of duties.179
III.3 Liability schemes in the legal governance of the environment
Article 8 of the [Paris] Agreement does not involve or provide a basis
for any liability or compensation.180
Focusing on perfecting and diversifying liability arrangements
displaces a large part of the inadequacy that the concept of “responsibility”
faces in improving the global governance of the environment.181 Some
Authors posit that out of countless quasi-principles permeating IEL, that of

178. BURNS H. WESTON & DAVID BOLLIER, GREEN GOVERNANCE: ECOLOGICAL
SURVIVAL, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE LAW OF THE COMMONS 191 (2013). However, the ICJ
did not endorse the equation of this principle with a reversal of the burden. See Ginevra Le
Molli et al., Whither the Proof? The Progressive Reversal of the Burden of Proof in
Environmental Cases before International Courts and Tribunals, 8 J.I.D.S. 644 (2017).
179. Just to exemplify, provided the proven concretisation of an actual damage,
liability may be incurred into for the unfulfillment of different sets of actions, ranging from
cooperation in scientific research, prior notice, stakeholders consultation, information
exchange, reporting, impact assessment, administrative oversight, relevant legislation etc.
to the duties of preventing, compliance monitoring, recording, containing, performing (or at
least funding) cleaning-up activities, assisting in the re-adaptation and elaboration of
copying strategies, etc., or again, even ex post, for failing to investigate and thus to “lesson
learn.” Several jurisdictions demand the execution of environmental and archaeological
feasibility studies and expert evaluations at the same time, grounded on the precautionary
principle; a few countries also show an approach to international investment law warranting
the inclusion in their BITs of a clause calling for special care when it comes to investments
potentially impacting sites of tangible or intangible cultural significance (see, e.g.,
Art.200(3) of the 2008 China-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement). Preventive actions on
long-term pollution (low intensity) or the drawing of contingency plans for possibly
impending disasters (high intensity) may be required, along with the establishment of
financial compensatory plans at the governmental level, whilst leaving States to deal with
their own private entities subsequently (burden shifting).
180. Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Decision 1/CP.21, UN Doc
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015), at ¶ 52.
181. See generally Rajendra Ramlogan, The Environment and International Law:
Rethinking the Traditional Approach, 3 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2001).
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liability for damage is an unconfutable one, endowed with the status of
customary law;182 consequently, it seems a solid terrain to assess the “state
of the art” in environmental protection in a given country, as well as the
way the environmental protection implemented by said country might
positively spill-over onto another legal protection: that to cultural heritage.
The Stockholm Declaration encouraged States to formulate their own
liability rules for transboundary damage,183 yet
[r]elevant issues not addressed include the type and degree
of environmental harm to be prevented, the procedural obligations
(such as notification, consultation, and cooperation) that are
necessary to ensure that harm does not occur or is minimised, and
whether the obligation of prevention is one of strict liability or due
diligence, and the relevant remedies applicable in the event of any
breach.184
Conversely, UN-sponsored Guidelines for the development of
national legislation on liability, response action and compensation for
damage caused by activities dangerous to the environment185—adopted by
UNEP’s Governing Council at its 11th Special Session in Bali together with
its Guidelines for the development of national legislation on access to
information, public participation and access to justice in environmental
matters—are so detailed that, although non-binding like the Stockholm
Declaration, leave far less leeway to States not only in legislating on the
matter, but in deciding how such legislation should be worded and what
exceptions it should provide for. On top of that, fundamental scholarly
views include the Resolution “Responsibility and Liability under
International Law for Environmental Damage” released by the Institute of
International Law in 1997, the Principles on Climate Change and Climate
Liability Under Public International Law developed by the International
Law Association in 2014 and, most authoritatively, the 2001 Draft of
Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities adopted by
the International Law Commission (“ILC”).186 The same ILC, in its Draft
182. E.g., Winfried Lang, UN Principles and International Environmental Law, 3
MAX PLANCK YRBK. U. N. L. 157, 165–166 (1999).
183. See Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, Report of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UN Doc.A/CONF.48/14, at principles 21–
22 (1972).
184. STEPHENS, supra note 166, at 153.
185. UNEP/GCSS.XI/L.5 (2010).
186. Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities
in Report of the International Law Commission, Official Records of the General Assembly,
Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10). See e.g., Arts. 3, 8 and related
Commentaries (e.g., Commentary 10 to Art. 3, on due diligence). Those two articles build
on Principles 13, 18 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.
194
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Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm
Arising Out of Hazardous Activities (2006 second reading), has included
cultural heritage in the scope of property187 (even if the Draft’s scope
deliberately excluded economic and financial harms related to
environmental ones in the aftermath of transboundary pollution188).
Somewhat similarly, even the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection
to the Antarctic Treaty—also called “Antarctic-Environmental Protocol,”
or “Madrid Protocol”—mentioned the “degradation of, or substantial risk
to, areas of biological, scientific, historic, aesthetic or wilderness
significance“189 before calling for the specification of liabilities for
damage.190 The 1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral
Resource Activities (“CRAMRA”) had only referred to the obligation of
taking into account “the preservation of historic monuments”191 before
deciding on new Antarctic mineral resource expeditions.
Further significant efforts have been deployed by regional UN bodies;
for instance, the UNECE Industrial Accidents Convention, already
mentioned supra,
is part of a pan-European legal framework to protect our
environment and encourage sustainable development that has
been negotiated by governments within the UN/ECE in response
to regional challenges. Apart from this Convention, the
framework also consists of four other multilateral agreements:
Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution and its

187. Draft principles on the allocation of loss in the case of transboundary harm
arising out of hazardous activities in Report of the International Law Commission, Official
Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/61/10).
Principle 2(a)(ii); see also Principles 4, 7.
188. See HANQIN XUE, TRANSBOUNDARY DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1st ed.
2003). Whilst the Author was later elected as a Member of the International Law
Commission and as a Judge and Vice-President of the International Court of Justice, this
monograph is an expanded version of her SJD Thesis at Columbia University Law School
under the supervision of Professor Oscar Schachter, thus its contents might not perfectly
align with her later official views on these dossiers. Moreover, the fact that at the time of
publication she was already serving as the Director-General of the Law and Treaty
Department of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs helps explain the virtual absence of
references to Chinese law and its international implications, which is truly unfortunate and
quite a severe gap in her study.
189. Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 1991, 30
I.L.M. 1455, 1462. Art. 3(2)(b)(vi) (emphasis added).
190. Annex VI on Liability Arising from Environmental Emergencies to the Protocol
on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty art. 16 (June 14, 2005).
191. Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities art. XV
(1), June 2, 1988.
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eight Protocols;192 Convention on the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and its
Protocol on Water and Health; Convention on Environmental
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context; and Convention
on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decisionmaking and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.193
As for the Inter-American System, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights’ Advisory Opinion on Environment and Human Rights,
released on 7 February 2018, is the reference authority on transboundary
environmental damage.194 Given that similar human rights arrangements
do not feature in the Asian regionalism and international human rights law
is factually unserviceable in Chinese courts, no comparable judgement
bears any relevance for China. The non-binding 2007 Singapore
Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment adopted by
ASEAN members along with Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea
and New Zealand limits itself to formulaic expressions with no mention of
either cultural heritage or liabilities, whilst confirming in passing “support
for UNFCCC work [. . .] including through appropriate international
incentives and assistance.”195
As for international judicial pronouncements, pre-eminence shall be
accorded to notable International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) case-law196
which, having been already explored in-depth in legal scholarship, will not
be examined in detail here.

192. UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE (“UNECE”),
CONVENTION ON THE TRANSBOUNDARY EFFECTS OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS (2015). See
“Considering . . . ” in the Preamble.
193. From its description on UNECE’s official website, at https://perma.cc/FWX95UAR. [footnotes added]
194. Out of a vast literature on this much-awaited IACtHR Opinion, see Monica
Feria-Tinta & Simon C. Milnes, The Rise of Environmental Law in International Dispute
Resolution: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights Issues a Landmark Advisory
Opinion on the Environment and Human Rights, 27 Y.B. OF INT’L ENVTL L. 64 (2016);
Giovanny Vega-Barbosa & Lorraine Aboagye, Human Rights and the Protection of the
Environment: The Advisory Opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, EJIL:
TALK! (Feb. 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/SYW8-GQ84.
195. Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment, Nov.
21, 2007, art. 9(d) (emphasis added).
196. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 241; Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v.
People's Republic of Albania, Judgment, 1940 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9, 1949)); GabcikovoNagymaros Project (Hungry v. Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 38 (Sept. 25, 1997) (Weeramantry,
J.); Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), 2010 I.C.J. ¶ 122 (Apr. 20,
2010) (Cançado Trindade, J.); Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand
intervening), 2014 I.C.J. ¶ 47 (Feb. 6, 2014) (Cançado Trindade, J.).
196
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On another note, private liability schemes are widespread.197 The
1999 Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting
from Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal
does not mention damage to cultural property/heritage, consistently with
all others which focus on the natural consequences of environmental
hazards. Among them, we shall mention at least the 1963 Vienna
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, the 1969 International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, the 1992 Protocol
which created the 1992 Civil Liability Convention, the 1971 International
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, the 2000 Protocol leading to the
FUND Convention, the 1993 Convention on Civil Liability for Damage
Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, and the 2010
Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress
to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. In civil liability schemes
concerning the environment, strict liability is the norm, and absolute
liability its exception.198 Most are yet to enter into force, and it is far from
clear whether they establish any individual civil liability directly under
international law, instead of the more “classical” state liability for failing
to enforce liability schemes bearing on non-state actors within signatories’
domestic jurisdiction.199
In the ship-owning market, under the CLC/FUND, HNSC, and
Bunkers Convention regimes, a strict liability model in which
compensation claims are shifted against the insurer benefitted both the
victims (certainty of redress) and the polluters (no delays due to arrest and
inspection by coastal States, and no litigation on faults as cases can be
settled amicably).200
IV. Why is China important?
[T]o the extent that China has thrived, it has been by defying
many elements of the neo-liberal model. Leave out China, and the

197. For a concise commented overview, see Andrea Laura Mackielo, Core Rules of
International Environmental Law, 16 ILSA J. of INT’L and COMP. L. 259, 271–73 (2009).
198. Philippe Cullet, Liability and redress for human-induced global warming:
Towards an international regime, 43 STAN. J. of INT’L L. 99, 111–12 (2007).
199. Vincent-Joël Proulx, International Civil Individual Responsibility and the
Security Council: Building the Foundations of a General Regime, 40 MICH. J. of INT’L L.
215, 230–31 (2019).
200. ALAN KHEE-JIN TAN, VESSEL-SOURCE MARINE POLLUTION: THE LAW AND
POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 342–43 (2005).
197
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story of the rest of the world is sluggish growth in the North,
erratic growth in the South and rising inequality everywhere.201
IV.1 Seeking coherence and prospect in China’s “exceptionalism”
Since July 2019, at pair with Italy, China registers the highest number
(fifty-five) of UNESCO-protected sites inscribed in the World Heritage
List, and due to China’s size (and civilisational history), not to mention its
unyielding “soft”-power within UNESCO,202 it is going to outpace the
Italian “competitor” soon. Some of the most well-preserved sites globewide combining nature with heritage are in China;203 for instance, the
founding director of the United Nations University Institute for Integrated
Management of Material Fluxes and of Resources cites the case of
Hángzhōu [杭州], in the Zhèjiāng province [浙江省], hosting the “West
Lake Cultural Landscape [. . . ,] where natural elements, farmed landscape
and artificial elements manifest a perfect fusion.”204 Populations’
relationship with natural and cultural heritage in rural areas represents a
story of fragile yet almost uninterrupted symbiosis: almost 78% of China’s
protected areas are located in the country’s western provinces of Xīzàng,
Xīnjiāng, and Sìchuān,205 way poorer compared to the sparkling of those
coastal cities (like Shànghǎi) China is most known for today beyond its
borders.
201. KEVIN P. GALLAGHER and RICHARD KOZUL-WRIGHT, A NEW
MULTILATERALISM: GENEVA PRINCIPLES FOR A GLOBAL GREEN NEW DEAL FOR SHARED
PROSPERITY 19 (Global Development Policy Center, 2019).
202. See Enrico Bertacchini, Claudia Liuzza & Lynn Meskell, Shifting the balance
of power in the UNESCO World Heritage Committee: An empirical assessment, 23(3) INT’L
J. OF CULTURAL POL’Y 331, 334, 345 (2017).
203. This article focuses on the so-called “Mainland China,” which coincides with
the internationally recognized territory of the People’s Republic of China except for its two
Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong (“HKSAR”) and Macao (“MSAR”). This
notwithstanding, HKSAR and MSAR, together with a number of cities surrounding the
Pearl River Delta in the Mainland’s Guangdong Province, represent an increasingly cardinal
economic powerhouse known as the Greater Bay Area (“GBA”), which comes to be of
outstanding preciousness (and precarity) artistically and environmentally as well. The
linkage between cultural heritage and the environment in the GBA is illustrated in Rostam
Josef Neuwirth & Zhijie Chen, The Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macao Greater Bay Area:
Cultural Heritage Laws as a Bridge between Past and Future, 50(2) HONG KONG L.J. 743–
779 (2020) (see particularly p. 765, about Annex 10 to the Technical Memoranda on Hong
Kong’s Environmental Impact Assessment Process).
204. Retrievable from Reza Ardakanian & Stephan Hülsmann, Impact of Global
Change on World Heritage and on Environmental Resources: The Need for an Integrated
Management Approach, CLIMATE CHANGE AS A THREAT TO PEACE: IMPACTS ON CULTURAL
HERITAGE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 101, 103 (Sabine von Schorlemer & Sylvia Maus eds.,
2014) (emphasis added).
205. Miao He & An Cliquet, Sustainable development through a rights-based
approach to conserve protected areas in China, 3 CHINA-EU L.J. 143, 144 (2014).
198
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Beginning with the First Opium War in the 1840s through the WW2,
Europeans contributed to a barbarian negation of China’s civilised and
civilisational roots by destroying or looting most of its heritage, in what is
known as the “Century of Humiliation” (Bǎinián Guóchǐ, 百年国耻).206
Today, China prides itself on its millennia-long civilisation, yet it has never
been able or willing to comprehensively adopt a management plan for its
cultural heritage as to preserve what remains of its vestiges to the benefit
of the upcoming generations.207 To the contrary, few movements in human
history have attacked their own cultural heritage—both tangible and
intangible, movable and immovable—as mercilessly as the fanatics of the
Cultural Revolution—Chinese themselves—did: “the Cultural
Revolutionary campaign of “destroying the Four Olds” (pòsìjiù, 破四旧)
meant attacking old ideas, old habits, old customs, and old culture.”208 The
exaltation of human labour entailed no machines (differently from the
Soviets), crude rejection of intellectuals, no lawyers, people-to-people
diplomacy, in an “it’s all about mobilising labour”-fashion; the fact that this
triggered widespread destruction of cultural heritage speaks volumes about
the latter’s ideal identification as a product of the intellect rather than of
manual labour, otherwise, it would have perhaps been saved. Nonetheless,
when judged from an environmental prism, the country did come a long
way from the barbarism of the “Cultural” Revolution to reasonably genuine
environmental commitments bearing indirect but positive effects on
cultural heritage protection. As such, China testifies to the importance of
this linkage at its best. For example, under the 2007-revised Cultural Relics
Protection Law [guójiā wénwù bǎohùfǎ, 国家文物保护法], Chinese
“[e]nvironmental agencies may punish violations […] involving pollution
levels at protected sites,”209 although enforcement efforts still languish.
China’s environmental law, extremely advanced and rich on paper—

206. See ERIK RINGMAR, LIBERAL BARBARISM: THE EUROPEAN DESTRUCTION OF THE
PALACE OF THE EMPEROR OF CHINA (2013); DAVID SCOTT, CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM, 1840–1949: POWER, PRESENCE, AND PERCEPTIONS IN A CENTURY OF HUMILIATION,
41, 260 (2008); HUI ZHONG, CHINA, CULTURAL HERITAGE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2–3
(2018).
207. Yunxia Wang, Enforcing Import Restrictions of China’s Cultural Objects: The
Sino-US Memorandum of Understanding, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL
HERITAGE LAW 240, 241 (Tami Blumenfield and Helaine Silverman eds., 2013).
208. Curtis Ashton, Beijing’s Museums in the Context of the 2008 Beijing Olympics,
CULTURAL HERITAGE POLITICS IN CHINA 187, 190 n.1 (Tami Blumenfield & Helaine
Silverman eds., 2013).
209. Phillip Newell, The PRC’s Law for the Protection of Cultural Relics, 13 ART
ANTIQUITY & L. 1, 53 (2008). This was confirmed in art. 67 of the 2017 revision, according
to which Chinese environmental agencies may punish violations involving polluting
facilities at protected sites.
199
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starting with Article 26 of the 1982 Constitution—is in fact infamous for
the incompliance thereof, especially in the most decentralised provinces.210
Environment-wise, “China’s participation in international
environmental conferences and conventions on biodiversity preservation
followed upon [its] opening up to global forces after the Maoist era, and
expressed the increased value [it] placed in the UN and international
law.”211 At present, China shows the contradiction of representing the
world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases and a firmly committed
environmentalist power at once, with new renewable-energy projects
realised every day (including the production of electric cars) and local draft
regulations on mandatory emission trading systems. “[A]ny success of
reduction in those developed [S]tates having fulfilled their obligations in
respect to reduction to climate change (like [in] the EU), are more than
compensated simply by the increase of emissions of fast developing
countries. China is meanwhile the world’s biggest emitter; [however, this]
may be explained by the large population” rather than dismissal of genuine
environmental public-policy concerns,212 as China scores low per-capita
emission levels. If a couple of decades ago only foreign firms operating in
China possessed the technology needed to build coal-efficient power plants,
yet this economic-ecological gain was frequently annulled by high
transaction costs due to difficulties in copying with unfriendly
governmental bureaucratic procedures,213 today Chinese firms own similar
and more advance technologies that can lead environmental progress from
within (and even export it regionally). As for the emission trading systems,
China does not host an international one214—which would be a worthwhile
policy action to pursue, since “the problem of sharing the burden equitably

210. See generally Wanxin Li [李万新], Environmental Governance: Issues and
Challenges, 36 ENVTL L. REP. 10506, 10515–10525 (2006).
211. GERALD A. MCBEATH & LENG TSE-KANG, GOVERNANCE OF BIODIVERSITY
CONSERVATION IN CHINA AND TAIWAN 75 (2006). As for biodiversity specifically, China is
a party to the Convention on Biological Diversity (5 June 1992; 1760 U.N.T.S. 69) and will
host the Fifteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to said Convention in Kunming
from 17–30 May 2021. By contrast, it has (temporarily?) not undersigned the Leaders’
Pledge for Nature (text available at https://perma.cc/K7J9-PXSR) developed by the Alliance
of Small Island States to reverse biodiversity loss by 2030. See Lisa M. Cox, Australia joins
US, China and Russia in refusing to sign leaders' pledge on biodiversity, GUARDIAN (2020),
https://perma.cc/T83W-E86P.
212. Simon Spyra & Eike Albrecht, Beside Adaptation: Concepts for the Future,
IMPLEMENTING ADAPTATION STRATEGIES BY LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND PLANNING
INSTRUMENTS ON CLIMATE CHANGE 329, 334–37 (Eike Albrecht et al. eds., 2014).
213. Thomas Charles Heller, Additionality, Transactional Barriers and the Political
Economy of Climate Change, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS ON CLIMATE
CHANGE 203, 219–220 (Carlo Carraro ed., 1999).
214. VEERLE VANDEWEERD, CITIES AND LOW-CARBON DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 36–
7 (China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development, 2014).
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is significantly less difficult if emission rights are tradeable”215—but
recently implemented a nationwide system,216 which have attracted
curiosity and political praise217 but also informed criticisms and scepticism
from the scientific community.218 However, the general attitude of the
Chinese government stands out of the general wisdom that “scientific
evidence tends to be deconstructed to the extent that it threatens powerful
political and economic interests,” even more remarkably insofar as
“authoritarian regimes as a whole tend to sacrifice the environment in favor
of other concerns.”219 Obviously, in any case, a country cannot be
measured against its commitments but against its actions, which means that
if the latter do not suffice, the legal framework should accompany—and
possibly compel—higher effectiveness accordingly.
China’s fierce battle against ozone depletion is exemplificatory in that
it shows that despite implementation difficulties, Beijing honoured its
commitments under the 1987 Montreal Protocol,220 motivated by appraisals
on international reputation but also encouraged by a Multilateral Fund
established by developed countries.221 In this case, the Fund follows a
different rationale compared to similar economic arrangements in
environmental treaties: its money is provided by the industrialised nations
through expert organisations (UNEP, UNDP, World Bank, regional

215. Glenn W. Harrison & Thomas F. Rutherford, Burden Sharing, Joint
Implementation, and Carbon Coalitions, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
ON CLIMATE CHANGE 77, 77 (Carlo Carraro ed., 1999).
216. Covering “eight energy-intensive sectors, namely petrochemical, chemical,
building materials, iron and steel, non-ferrous metal, papermaking, power generation and
aviation industries, [t]he national ETS targets more than 7,000 industrial companies and
aircraft operators whose annual energy consumption is more than 10,000 tons of standard
coal in any year during 2013-2015 [ . . . ]. It covers about 5 billion tons of CO2 or half of
national overall emissions, leading China to become the biggest carbon market in the
world.” ZHEN JIN & ERI IKEDA, THE LATEST PROGRESS OF EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEMES IN
JAPAN, CHINA AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 7 (Institute for Global Environmental Strategies,
2017), https://perma.cc/X4TK-CSKE.
217. See, e.g., the proposals advanced in Melinda Melvin, China’s Emissions
Trading System: Steps toward article 6 linkage, 31 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F., 197, 197–
223 (2019).
218. On the most recent developments see Jennifer Morris et al., Impacts of China’s
emissions trading schemes on deployment of power generation with carbon capture and
storage, 81 ENERGY ECON., 848 (2019); Mao-Zhi Deng & Wen-Xiu Zhang, Recognition and
analysis of potential risks in China’s carbon emission trading markets, 10 ADVANCES IN
CLIMATE CHANGE RES. 30 (2019).
219. Myanna Lahsen, Trust Through Participation? Problems of Knowledge in
Climate Decision Making, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CLIMATE CHANGE: POWER,
KNOWLEDGE, NORMS, DISCOURSES 173, 186 (Mary E. Pettenger ed., 2007).
220. Jimin Zhao & Leonard Ortolano, The Chinese Government’s Role in
Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements: The Case of the Montreal Protocol,
175 CHINA Q. 708, 710 (2003).
221. Id. at 714–15.
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banks)222 and allocated to the developing ones for the latter to reach the
desired and previously agreed targets;223 as such, it does not serve the more
common function of “compensating” third countries or the “international
community” in the event of incidents or incompliance. “There seems to be
an evident need to coordinate the Ozone Regime with the Climate Change
Regime, since some of the substitute substances to ozone-depleting gases
are classified as greenhouse gases under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the
[…] UNFCCC.”224 As China is set to organise around a few megalopolis225
and its GDP has quintupled between 2000 and 2020, it shall remain seized
on the matter in order to avoid pollution-congestion phenomena.
IV.2 “Keeping face” amid internationalism and transnationalism
At present, environmentally, China defines itself as a “responsible
developing country”226 that intends to protect the environment also beyond
its borders, as a necessary component of its model of “shared future” (or
“common destiny”) for mankind [人类命运共同体].227 If we assume as
true that “climate change can be seen as a potentially unique opportunity to
develop more rational and egalitarian international governance structures
and normative reforms not at variance with the principle of ‘sustainable
development’,”228 the relevant questions are whether China: 1) looks
forward to a more egalitarian legal governance or tends to adapt to existing
schemes by aspiring to replacing its current game-holders;229 2) deems
222. Charlotte M.J. Streck, Financial instruments and cooperation in implementing
international agreements for the global environment, MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE OF
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: PERSPECTIVES FROM SCIENCE, SOCIOLOGY AND THE LAW
493, 498 (Gerd Winter ed., 2006).
223. Donald L. Goldberg (U.N. Ambassador) et al., Effectiveness of trade and
positive measures in multilateral environmental agreements: Lessons from the Montreal
Protocol, 103 UNEP (1997) (Background paper prepared by the Center for International
Environmental Law for the United Nations Environment Programme).
224. NICHOLAS A. ROBINSON & LAL KURUKULASURIYA, UNEP TRAINING MANUAL
ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 106 (2006).
225. Min Shao et al., City Clusters in China: Air and Surface Water Pollution, 4
FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY & THE ENV’T 353, 353-61 (2006).
226. Second National Communication on Climate Change of The People’s Republic
of China 14, 101 (2012).
227. Liza Tobin, Xi’s Vision for Transforming Global Governance: A Strategic
Challenge for Washington and Its Allies, 2 TEX. NAT’L SECURITY R. 154, 164 (2018).
228. Chechi, supra note 113, at 193.
229. In fact, it has been postulated that “if we think of China in terms of
exceptionalism we are incapable of understanding the current international legal order;” see
Maria Adele Carrai, Global Constitutionalism and the Challenge of China’s
Exceptionalism, GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM WITHOUT GLOBAL DEMOCRACY (?),
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE WORKING PAPERS 21, 108 (Claudio Corradetti &
Giovanni Sartor eds., 2016), https://perma.cc/5SXX-T5AU.
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development to be subjected to its “sustainable” qualification; 3) reputes
climate change a sufficiently strong leverage to enhance its forthcoming
role as “responsible superpower” in the community of nations; and 4) will
keep its promises and resolutions, when tested against reality in the short
as well as long run, including potential slowdown in its annual GDP
growth. One may wonder, by way of exemplification, whether China’s
authoritarian environmentalism is capable of securing the outcomes it
strives for, when tested against more democratic modes of environmental
governance.230 In other words, the dilemma does not only concern how
China behaves today—when, borrowing from comparative economichistory literature, it might be said to benefit from the “advantage of
backwardness,”231 but how it would act in forwardness if/when acquiring
superpower responsibilities; no one can predict the future, yet some insights
can be inferred by retracing China’s behaviour in recent history. Beijing’s
rebuttal of decentralisation in such a vast and populated country learns from
a past regulatory chaos made of “fragmented authority and problems of
accountability,”232 but it is not limited to that: China’s authoritarianism in
environmental policymaking envisions an interpretation of the Executive’s
role domestically, yet also of China in international affairs towards the
edification of an allegedly “new” world order. While Chinese leaders keep
tightening their grip domestically, the foundation of the world order they

230. See Bruce Gilley, Authoritarian environmentalism and China’s response to
climate change, 21 ENVTL. POL. 287, 287–307 (2012).
231. See, e.g., Alexander Gerschenkron, ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE: A BOOK OF ESSAYS 5–30 (1962). In broad political terms, this advantage
translates in the chance for China to pledge industrial commitments and deploy rhetorical
artifices that would possibly be untenable or no longer strategically convenient if it were a
superpower like the US is today. Economically, instead, backwardness implies that China
could “adopt production methods with lower emission and/or resource intensity that were
developed by industrialized nations; implement environmental policies based on scientific
knowledge on environmental pollution and damage; and promote industrial sites leading to
low emission intensity in the early stages of economic development[, thus dodging] the
serious environmental deterioration and pollution industrialized nations have experienced
and ‘tunnel[ling] through.’” See Akihisa Mori, Sustainable development and environmental
governance, in East Asia, ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES 4 (2013). See also Justin Yifu Lin [林毅夫], China’s growth
miracle in the context of Asian transformation, WIDER Working Paper No. 92 5 n.5 (2018).
Economics literature suggests that despite the advantage-of-backwardness manifesto, “less
developed nations need to make a number of foundational investments in their own
technological capabilities in order to subsequently be able to adopt the green technologies
developed in the ‘North’ and adapt them to their particular settings. Whether investments
in green innovation in the ‘North’ will strengthen the incentives of less developed nations
sufficiently to lead them to invest in the required absorptive capacity is an open empirical
question.” See Philippe Mario Aghion & Xavier Jaravel, Knowledge Spillovers, Innovation
and Growth, 125(583) THE ECON. J. 533, 538 (2015).
232. Michael G. Faure et al., Bucking the Kuznets curve: Designing effective
environmental regulation in developing countries, 51 VA. J. OF INT’L L. 65, 122 (2010).
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strive to pursue and ultimately champion rests on an anti-imperialistic,
democratic system of global governance. Although the self-restrained
accomplishment of this plan is far from granted, on the conceptual plane it
does not stand in contradiction to the Party’s autocratic rule: “democracy”
as intended by Beijing is that between States in the international relations
of a multipolar, no-longer-American world, and not that within States
(although one might obviously wonder whether the former, as a cornerstone
of Westphalian international law, is truly meaningful—of even long-term
feasible—in the absence of domestic accountability mechanisms for
internationally negotiated and implemented policies).
The fear of “losing face” being paramount in China, one overall
forecast could be that the Chinese would prefer to contribute their share to
a common international fund whilst adhering to the “classical” state
responsibility in general, rather than being held liable in particular
transboundary cases and settle those cases “at pair with” individual
claimants from third countries. Apart from China that would contribute
internationally whilst keeping its face transnationally, usually States settle
these cases bilaterally or multi-bilaterally233 by facing their specific liability
on a case-by-case basis, as they find this last solution more convenient both
money- and time-wise. The 2005 Songhua River incident between China
and Russia,234 involving petrochemical plants and originated between the
two northernmost Chinese industrial cities of Jilin and Harbin, is to be
recalled in passing as a “case-study within the case-study;” this is
illustrative because of the close geopolitical ties between the two States, in
that politics in this field cannot be easily dismissed or discerned from the
law. Not secondarily,
while the possibility of severe punitive sanctions should in
theory deter violations, they can also, ironically, deter officials
from disclosing pollution, as they fear personal liability [. . .
F]earing such retribution, local officials in Jilin initially withheld
information about the Songhua River toxic spill from

233. See for example, the legally multifaceted collaboration between Singapore and
Indonesia to prevent transboundary “haze pollution:” Kexian Ng, Transboundary Haze
Pollution in Southeast Asia: The Effectiveness of Three Forms of International Legal
Solutions, 10 J. OF EAST ASIA & INT’L L. 221 (2017) (“Multi-bilateralism” stands for the
pursuance and fulfilment of bilateral interests and commitments through multilateral
settings (at times pretentiously, other times transparently), and this makes it a hybrid form
of international cooperation, intermediate between bilateralism and multilateralism).
234. See Xuyu Hu, The doctrine of liability fixation of state responsibility in the
convention on transboundary pollution damage, 20 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS 179, 182
(2020).
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environmental agencies, government officials in the downriver
province of Heilongjiang and Beijing, and the public.235
V. China, Domestically
[I]n conceptualizing the law of property as it applies to
environmental protection, we could learn a good deal from the
Romans. We can conceive of seashores, for example, not as areas
subject to unlimited private rights, but as places over which the
[S]tate exercises a trust for the benefit of the public. That view is
now reflected in some American cases.236
V.1 China and Western capitalism: from energy and the environment
to the environment and culture
Energy and environmental policies are similarly bound to common
fate, through a link the EU struggles to match in its external action, owing
to its responsibilities distribution across several Directorates-General and
the overall “constitutional” configuration of the EU as a sui iuris
organisation.238 This is regrettable: “China is a huge global energy polluter
due to the extensive use of coal, and making China share the EU views on
the link between energy, energy security and climate change [would be]
therefore of crucial importance.”239 Similiter, the argument goes for the
interdependency between natural and cultural heritage.240
237

235. Allison Moore & Adria Warren, Legal Advocacy in Environmental Public
Participation in China: Raising the Stakes and Strengthening Stakeholders, 8 CHINA ENV’T
SERIES 3, 13 (2006).
236. James Russell Gordley, The Enforcement of Foreign Law: Reclaiming One
Nation’s Cultural Heritage in Another Nation’s Courts, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL
CULTURAL HERITAGE LAW 110, 122 (James Russell Gordley & Francesco Francioni eds.,
2013). For the concept of “public trusteeship” in the law of Ancient Rome, see Brian John
Preston, The Evolving Role of Environmental Rights in Climate Change Litigation, 2
CHINESE J. OF ENVTL L. 131, 136 (2018).
237. See, e.g., Maria Kenig-Witkowska, The European Union Perspective on
Cultural Heritage and Climate Change Issues, 3 J. OF COMP. URB. L. & POL’Y 63, 73–4
(2019).
238. See Rafael Leal-Arcas & Antonio Morelli, The Resilience of the Paris
Agreement: Negotiating and Implementing the Climate Regime, 31 GEO. ENVTL L. REV. 1,
34, 40 (2018).
239. Jakub M. Godzimirski and Nina Græger, Conclusion: The EU, Energy, and
Global Power Shifts, EU LEADERSHIP IN ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE:
GLOBAL AND LOCAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 203, 208 (Jakub M. Godzimirski ed.,
2016).
240. Margherita Paola Poto, Environmental Regulation in China through the lens of
the European Model, 18 ASIA PAC. J. OF ENVTL. L. 69, 84 (2016).
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Although “China’s Ecological Civilisation” [Zhōngguó shēngtài
wénmíng, 中国 生态文明] is built on an autocratic, bombastic, top-down
and hierarchical—but politically driven—version of the Western academic
concept of the “Anthropocene,”241 China’s cultural heritage strategy for
inclusive growth emphasises the economic impact of such heritage over its
societal implications.242 This cannot surprise all those who noticed that
despite pretences of differentiation on moral grounds,243 the Chinese model
has not been able to express any serious alternative to the exploitative
anthropocentric model invented by post-Medieval Europeans,244 which
captures the quintessence of humans as the exclusive uncontested masters
of the Earth245 (both natural and cultural forms of heritage included). In
fact, the “idealisation of “communist” China as somehow an ecotopian
prototype [ . . . ] seems very misplaced in the wake of post-Tiananmen
Square capitalist China.”246 As mentioned in the previous paragraphs,
Europe and other Western actors (e.g., Canada) are striving to remedy to
their historical legacy by propelling a new model based on human-nature
conceptual interdependence and operative integration, which has not yet
appealed to China (perhaps out of fears of renewed separatism247). This is
241. Coraline Goron, Ecological Civilisation and the Political Limits of a Chinese
Concept of Sustainability, 4 CHINA PERSPECTIVES 39, 43–5 (2018).
242. BRITISH COUNCIL 2018, CULTURAL HERITAGE FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH, at 18.
https://perma.cc/6J67-BSD3.
243. “For a fruitful intellectual dialogue on sustainability involving China to take
place, it is essential to distinguish between those who try to develop an [Ecological
Civilisation] theory based on political philosophy principles and a general interrogation of
the means and ends of economic and political modernity based on the Chinese experience,
from those who hold that [Ecological Civilisation] designates the model of environmental
governance carried out by the Chinese government today. This cannot be achieved when
theory and practice are confused and when the global rise of China is simplistically equated
with the replacement of an ‘ecocidal’ Western hegemony by a presumably more
‘ecologically civilised’ Chinese hegemony” (and the reverse, obviously). Goron, supra note
241, at 49–50.
244. Franz M. Hartmann, Towards a Social Ecological Politics of Sustainability,
POLITICAL ECOLOGY: GLOBAL AND LOCAL 329, 335–340 (Roger H. Keil et al. ed., 1998);
Paul G. Harris, Environmental values in a globalising world: The case of China,
ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES IN A GLOBALISING WORLD: NATURE, JUSTICE AND GOVERNANCE
123, 124–25 (Jouni Paavola & Ian Lowe eds., (2005). Confucianism is particularly prone
to nature exploitation; see PETER HAY, MAIN CURRENTS IN WESTERN ENVIRONMENTAL
THOUGHT 97 (2002).
245. WESTON & BOLLIER, supra note 178, at 49; see also UPAMANYU PABLO
MUKHERJEE, POSTCOLONIAL ENVIRONMENTS: NATURE, CULTURE AND THE CONTEMPORARY
INDIAN NOVEL IN ENGLISH 62 (2010); Thomas Sparks, The Place of the Environment in State
of Nature Discourses: Reassessing nature, property and sovereignty in the Anthropocene,
10 MPIL RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 17 (2020).
246. DAVID E. PEPPER, MODERN ENVIRONMENTALISM: AN INTRODUCTION 96 (1996).
247. Joseph Kowalski, Environmentalism Isn’t New: Lessons from Indigenous Law,
26 BUFFALO ENVTL. L.J. 15, 51 (2019).
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perhaps because China has a few minorities but not diverse “indigenous
populations” like e.g., Canada, Australia, or Indonesia do,248 which is an
additional reason why it has not (yet) “absorbed” indigenous claims and
developed a public discourse to channel this sort of novel orientations.249
Recognising the interfaces between natural and cultural heritage is easier
for those who have built their survival upon a harmonious, non-exploitative
relationship with their surroundings. “Indigenous environmentalism [. . .]
has grounded itself in the idea that human use of the land is fundamental to
the well-being of both people and nature. The natural community is
incomplete without active human membership,”250 fashioned
participatorily at the street level.251 It is no accident that the 1989
International Labour Organisation (“ILO”) Convention No. 169 on
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples asks governments to ”ensure that, whenever
appropriate, studies are carried out, in co-operation with the peoples
concerned, to assess the social, spiritual, cultural and environmental impact

248. CLAUDIA SOBREVILA, THE ROLE OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN BIODIVERSITY
CONSERVATION: THE NATURAL BUT OFTEN FORGOTTEN PARTNERS 3 (The World Bank 2008)
(“[I]n Mexico and China the total population of Indigenous Peoples is large [ . . . ], while
the diversity of ethnic groups is relatively low [. . .]. In contrast, Brazil, Indonesia, and the
United States have a low number of indigenous inhabitants […] while their diversity is
relatively high [. . .]. Where the population of Indigenous Peoples is low, they tend to face
greater threats because they represent true minority groups”); see also id. at 20.
249. “At the normative level, an attitude of legal pluralism also creates space for a
much larger variety of norms that may be employed to devise cooperative solutions to the
global climate and biodiversity crises. For example, [. . .] the “slow activism” inherent in
indigenous [. . .] narratives can be employed to deconstruct and reshape definitions of the
Anthropocene associated with mono-cultural representations. In some Pacific Island
nations, local systems of customary resource use are increasingly recognised as valuable
normative approaches to environmental management as communities are seeking to cope
with the adverse effects of climate change [. . .]. These local systems are often undervalued
or ignored in international environmental law, in part because they tend to be located in oral
histories and other forms of intangible cultural heritage differing starkly from formal legal
sources.” Justin Rose et al., Primal Scene to Anthropocene: Narrative and Myth in
International Environmental Law, 66 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 441, 468 (2019); see also
Environmental Rule of Law – First Global Report, at 164, UNEP 2019; International Law
Commission, Sixty-eighth Session, Third report on the protection of the environment in
relation to armed conflicts (submitted by the Special Rapporteur, H.E. Marie G. Jacobsson),
¶ 57, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/700 (2016).
250. LANCE NEWMAN, THE LITERARY HERITAGE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
MOVEMENT: LANDSCAPES OF REVOLUTION IN TRANSATLANTIC ROMANTICISM 95 (2019)
(emphasis added).
251. See generally Stephen Stec, Developing Standards for Procedural
Environmental Rights through Practice: The Changing Character of Rio Principle 10,
PROCEDURAL ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS: PRINCIPLE X IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 3, 18 (Jerzy
Jendrośka & Magdalena Bar eds., 2018).
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on them of planned development activities.”252 Accordingly, what the
“lawyers of the Anthropocene” advocate is not a complete and utopian
human withdrawal from nature, but rather a balanced, respectful, and
harmonious coexistence between humans and natural landscapes (not
natural resources) that stands in line with the unifying theory of natural and
cultural heritage in their inextricable essentiality for “their” local
communities. Said lawyers of the Anthropocene interpret liability schemes
as transformative agents from commutative to restorative to distributional
justice—that is, a generative, autopoietic justice rather than an extractive
one. As one scholar recently put it, “our laws about nature should be
consistent with the laws of nature.”253 Considering that China suffers from
the absence of an indigenous population that can keep lawmakers on-guard
about the sophistication and ineluctability of human-nature linkages, it
would be a fortiori desirable that such linkages were enforced upon China
via international liability arrangements featuring nature-heritage
interactions and emphasising the “hidden,” profound meanings thereof.
Confirming the general considerations in the previous paragraphs, the
1992 China’s Maritime Code provides that “without prejudice to the right
of claims for loss of life or personal injury, claims with respect to damage
to harbor works, basins and waterways, and aids to navigation have priority
over other property claims”254 (arguably including culturally-significant
ones). Keeping the form and rejecting the substance, however, one may
take inspiration from this provision, insofar as one way of protecting
cultural heritage of universal value via complying with the World Heritage
Convention would be that of granting damages to such a heritage a similarly
phrased priority.
In sum, China has made unhoped-for progress as far as environmental
awareness is concerned255—involving both home companies and the supply
252. ILO Convention, No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, at 8 (1989) (art.
7(3) (emphasis added); see also Jeremy Firestone et al., Cultural Diversity, Human Rights,
and the Emergence of Indigenous Peoples in International and Comparative Environmental
Law, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 219, 238–39 (2005); Klemetti Näkkäläjärvi & Pekka
Kauppala, Sacred Sites of the Sámi – Linking Past, Present and Future, EXPERIENCING AND
PROTECTING SACRED NATURAL SITES OF SÁMI AND OTHER INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: THE
SACRED ARCTIC (Leena Heinämäki & Thora Martina Herrmann eds., 2017).
253. Jan G. Laitos, How Science Has Influenced, But Should Now Determine,
Environmental Policy, 43 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 759, 761 (2019) (emphasis
omitted).
254. Bingying Dong, &, Ling Zhu, Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage in
Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances: Chinese Perspective,
50 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 209, 219 (2019).
255. See Xiaoyi Jiang & Jianwei Zhang, China’s Legislative Practices on Climate
Change after the Paris Agreement, 10 J. OF EAST ASIA AND INT’L L. 259 (2017) (brief
overview of China’s central and regional legislation on environmental pollution in the
aftermath of the Paris Agreement); see also Zhilin Mu et al., Environmental Legislation in
China: Achievements, Challenges and Trends, 6 SUSTAINABILITY, 8967 (t.1) (2014).
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chain of multinational corporations256—but it has still a long way to go
before satisfactorily translating this awareness into effectively enforceable
mandates on liability.
V.2 Civil liability for environmental damages
Differently from virtually all civil-law jurisdictions, China had had no
comprehensive civil code until very recently: it is only in January 2021 that
the Chinese civil law, previously spread across sector-specific pieces of
legislation subordinated to the General Principles of the Civil Law of
China, will find updated systematisation in an enforceable PRC Civil Code.
To be sure, in the area of liability the Civil Code confines itself to the
reception of what the General Principles and dedicated laws had already
contemplated, with minor additions. The only difference—a rather
theoretical one—is that with the Civil Code, liability provisions are uplifted
to the status of “basic law” within the Chinese Constitution’s definition.257
The General Principles provided that “[c]ivil liability shall still be borne
even in the absence of fault, if the law [so] stipulates,”258 and that “[a]ny
person who pollutes the environment and causes damage to others in
violation of state provisions for environmental protection and the
prevention of pollution shall bear civil liability in accordance with the
law.”259 On the other hand, “[i]f any person causes damage to other people
by engaging in operations that are greatly hazardous to the surroundings [.
. .], he shall bear civil liability [. . .].”260 In sum, only those who engage in
ultrahazardous operations impacting other humans bear liability no matter
what, whilst others’ liability is conditional upon further qualifications
related to other sector-specific laws. Said sector-specific legislation may
well be, in this case, China’s Tort Liability Law (“TLL”) promulgated on
26th December 2009, in force from 1st July 2010;261 it provides that “[i]n
the event of any dispute arising from environmental pollution, the polluter
shall bear the burden of proof with regard to the legal basis for bearing no
liability or mitigation of its liability and the nonexistence of causation
between its act and the harmful consequences.”262 The TLL further
prescribes that “[w]here any harm is caused by environmental pollution for

256. SAM YOONSUK LEE ET AL., GREEN LEADERSHIP IN CHINA: MANAGEMENT
STRATEGIES FROM CHINA’S MOST RESPONSIBLE COMPANIES 63–64 (2014).
257. See ZHU WANG, ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMPILING A CIVIL CODE OF
CHINA: A PROCESS MAP FOR LEGISLATION BORN OUT OF PRAGMATISM 77–81 (2020).
258. Civil Code art. 106 (China) (emphasis added).
259. Id. at art. 124 (emphasis added).
260. Id. at art. 123.
261. Id. (An unofficial yet authoritative English translation is available at
https://perma.cc/3ESC-LV9G.)
262. Id. at art. 66.
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the fault of a third party, the injured party may require compensation from
either the polluter or the third party.”263 This latter provision is deemed to
confirm the Chinese fault-independent approach to liability in civil
litigation in environmental matters (as well as generally).264 As
environmental cases always turn to complex (and costly)265 evidentiary
appraisals and this burden-of-proof shift onto defenders is extremely,
indeed, burdensome for the latter, Chinese courts “often split the blame for
losses, a legal concept known as shared liability. In a 2004 case in
Shāndōng, for example, two fish farmers only received 51 per cent of their
requested compensation on the grounds that they should have sought
government help mitigating the effects of an oil spill.”266 The new Civil
Code maintains the scheme reported above, whilst extending the scope of
the damages (not only “environmental,” but also “ecological”) and
introducing punitive damages in the case of wilful harm,267 together with a
right to public-interest litigation which is not fully clarified.268 China’s
faultless-liability approach to environmental pollution was also confirmed
by the Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) Judicial Interpretation269 on the

263. SAM YOONSUK LEE ET AL., supra note 233, at art. 68.
264. Adam J. Moser & Tseming Yang, Environmental Tort Litigation in China, 41
ENVTL. L. REP. 10895, 10897 (2011).
265. See Christine J. Lee, “Pollute First, Control Later” No More: Combating
Environmental Degradation in China Through an Approach Based in Public Interest
Litigation and Public Participation, PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 795, 812–813 (2008).
266. Rachel E. Stern, From Dispute to Decision: Suing Polluters in China, 206 THE
CHINA QUARTERLY 294, 302 (2011) (“Shared liability” may correspond to joint liability,
several liability, or joint and several liability in Western common law, depending on the
case in point; yet, it does not perfectly overlap with any of them, which is one of the many
issues to be aware of when it comes to international negotiations on these technical
“legalise” details.).
267. See Jason E. Kelley, Seeking Justice for Pollution Victims in China: Why China
Should Amend the Tort Liability Law to Allow Punitive Damages in Environmental Tort
Cases, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 572, 572-57 (2012) (punitive damages had been already
suggested in legal scholarship); Vincent R. Johnson, Punitive Damages, Chinese Tort Law,
and the American Experience, 9 FRONTIERS OF L. IN CHINA 321, 326 (2014).
268. See Tiantian Zhai & Yen-Chiang Chang, The Contribution of China’s Civil Law
to Sustainable development: Progress and Prospects, 11 SUSTAINABILITY 294, 304 (2019)
(comparison between the ante and post Code environmental liability regime).
269. PRC law endows the SPC with the license to interpret very specific questions
regarding the application of laws, regulations, and decrees at all levels of Chinese judicial
proceedings; such interpretations are doctrinally deemed de facto binding. Zhōnghuá
rénmín gònghéguó fǎyuàn zǔzhī fǎ (中华人民共和国人民法院组织法) [The Law of the
People’s Republic of China on the Organization of the People’s Courts] (promulgated by
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 31, 2006, effective Jan. 1, 2007) (China) art.
33. For an overview of the legal instruments employed by the SPC to quasi-legislate within
the PRC’s civil-law system, see Susan Finder, The “Soft Law” of the Supreme People’s
Court, SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT MONITOR, https://perma.cc/VG34-W2ZQ.
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Application of Law in the Trial of Disputes over Liability for
Environmental Torts,270 which further specified that
the tort claimant should establish the “relatedness” (关联性)
rather than the “causality” between the emissions and the pollution
impact in issue, which clearly dilutes the burden of proof for
environmental tort claimants. [. . .] If the claimant succeeds, the
defendant, in turn, must provide evidence to prove that there is no
causal relationship between the polluting behaviour and the
damage.271
Interestingly, liability in the absence of fault was also part of China’s
trade strategy till recently:
previously there had been a legislative trend to focus
environmental responsibility for polluting factories onto “finished
goods producers”. These finished goods producers c[ould] be
final assembling factories or distributors along the supply chain.
This approach contrasted with that of the [EU], which puts
responsibility directly onto “producers” to identify all
environment-related data along the supply chain. Under the
[Energy-using Product Directive] of the EU, companies have to
report total energy used during a product’s lifecycle, including the
energy used during manufacturing and transportation. China has
moved in this direction with the [2002 Clean Production
Promotion Law]. This law has introduced the concept of producer
responsibility and life-cycle approach for both resource use and
waste management.272
The fact that differently from virtually all tort laws, the Chinese one
provides for liability of parties not at fault in several circumstances, owes
to the peculiar socio-political configuration of the country. “Chinese
academia often views tort law as a private law, which supposedly
recognizes the individual autonomy of the parties more than any other areas
of law. In fact, however, the TLL is deeply characterized by socialism and
is used as a tool to maintain social stability, which is the overwhelming goal

270. 最高人民法院关于审理环境侵权责任纠纷案件适用法律若干问题的解释,
adopted at the 1,644th Session of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People’s Court on
February 9, 2015, effective on June 3, 2015, art. 1.
271. Yue Zhao et al., Prospects for Climate Change Litigation in China, 8(2)
TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 349, 371 (2019).
272. Feng Lin et al., The political economy of China’s environmental law reforms,
LAW AND POLICY FOR CHINA’S MARKET SOCIALISM (John Garrick ed., 2012).
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of the [S]tate.”273 The same control that, at the international level, China
wants to feel released from.
One decade ago, Chinese law provided for three collective liability
schemes, yet rarely enforced (or even enforceable) in practice: the
Mechanism for Socializing Environmental Risks (“MSER”), the
Environmental Liability Insurance System (“ELIS”), and the
Environmental Damage Compensation System (“EDCS”).274 Ten years
later, too little has changed, despite the fact that courts have specified what
costs those liable might incur into. For example, the 2017 SPC’s Judicial
Interpretation on Compensation for Marine Environmental Damage
establishes a compensation regime encompassing “(a) the cost of
preventive measures; (b) the cost of reasonable measures of reinstatement;
(c) the loss during the period of reinstatement; and (d) the cost of
investigation and assessment.”275 The only proper advancement comes
from China’s Environmental Protection Law, which did not mention
liabilities in 1979 yet includes liability and compensation in its 2014
revision,276 while keeping with China’s long history of allowing for multiplaintiff lawsuits seeking compensation.277 Notable, too, is that in
December 2007 the then-State Environmental Protection Agency
(subsequently “PRC Ministry of Environmental Protection,” now “PRC
Ministry of Ecology and Environment”), jointly with China’s Insurance
Regulatory Commission, issued the Guidelines on the Development of
Pollution Liability Insurance, which have been be promoted in pilot cities
and provinces including Hunan, Hubei and Jiangsu, Ningbo, Shenyang,
Shanghai, Chongqing, Shenzhen, and Kunming.278

273. Liu Chenglin, Socialized Liability in Chinese Tort Law, 59 HARV. INT’L L.J. 16,
17 (2018); see also Wei Zhang, Understanding the Law of Torts in China: A Political
Economy Perspective, 11 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 171 (2016) (reiterating these observations
but through a more economic prism).
274. See Canfa Wang et al., Pondering over the incident of Songhua River pollution
from the perspective of environmental law, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LIABILITY: LEGAL REMEDIES FOR TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION 294–96 (Michael G. Faure
and Song Ying eds., 2008).
275. Dong, supra note 254, at 214.
276. Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Huánjìng Bǎohùfǎ (中华人民共和国环境保护
法（主席令第九号）) [Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 24, 2014, effective Jan. 1,
2015), art 5, 6, 52, ch. VI (China).
277. Tyler Liu, China’s Revision to the Environmental Protection Law: Challenges
to Public Interest Litigation and Solutions for Increasing Public Participation and
Transparency, 6 J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 60, 65 (2015).
278. Lin, supra note 272, at 109.
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V.3 The paradoxical Chinese attitudes in the “private” sector
Framed against stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory respectively,
business and sociological analyses have concluded that the non-binding
expectations of the Chinese government are forcing environmentallyunfriendly state-owned companies out of the market.279 Indeed, Chinese
large firms are increasingly engaged in voluntary corporate environmental
reporting due to paradoxically
coercive [institutional] isomorphism, whereby the Chinese
government links incentives such as grants and contracts and
access to resources to explicit [corporate social responsibility].
Although the [corporate environmental reporting] policies from
the Chinese government do not take the form of traditional
coercive [mandates] based on hard law, regulations, or taxes [. .
.], the authoritarian capitalist institutional structures and
environment mean that the incentives [. . .] that the [S]tate
introduces [are] perceived by Chinese firms to be mandatory in
nature [in the market’s level playing field].280

279. See Hui Situ and Carol Ann Tilt, Chinese government as a determinant of
corporate environmental reporting: A study of large Chinese listed companies, 18 J. ASIAPAC. CENT. FOR ENVTL. ACCOUNTABILITY 251 (2012); see also Hui Situ and Carol Ann Tilt,
Mandatory? Voluntary? A Discussion of Corporate Environmental Disclosure
Requirements in China, 38 SOC. & ENVTL. ACCOUNTABILITY J. 131 (2018). Interestingly,
this dynamic is not at play in the neighbouring India when it comes to e.g., liability for
nuclear damage. Pursuant to the 2010 Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, the
Government takes over the compensation quota applicable to liable state-owned companies
whenever said compensation exceeds the statutory amount specified in the Act. See M.P.
Ram Mohan, Indian Civil Nuclear Liability Law (CNLD Act): An Adventurism or
Exceptionalism in International Legal Discourse, LOCATING INDIA IN THE CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (Srinivas Burra and R. Rajesh Babu eds., 2018). To better
contextualise the Act, see also Ayushi Sutaria, Placing the Indian civil nuclear liability
regime in context: The extent of supplier’s liability, 17 J. RISK RES., 97 (2014).
280. Hui Situ et al., The Influence of the Government on Corporate Environmental
Reporting in China: An Authoritarian Capitalism Perspective, 56 BUS. & SOC’Y 1, 31
(2018).
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In a country where the silencing (often turning to self-censorship) of
NGOs, specialised press, and civil activism still represents the norm,281
where governmental policies about the environment can be only barely
challenged by the ordinary citizens,282 and where “the Government [ . . . ]
remains concerned that environmental activism could lead to a broader
push for political reform,”283 this de facto coercion blending normative
flexibility and market competition, which economists define as “induced
innovation,” appears to be the only leverage for the Party to build
responsible economic communities and gain their trust.284 This is
supported by an upholding of the piercing-the-corporate-veil doctrine,
explicitly codified in the 2005 PRC’s Company Law,285 as much as by
foreign competition.286 However, most emitters in China are state-owned
either formally or practically, and public or public-equivalent companies
notoriously (although somewhat counterintuitively) respond less flexibly to
the solicitations of legal and financial incentives introduced by

281. Yet, the strategies implemented by those same actors to resurface and bring their
claims and views forward should not be downplayed; to the contrary, some of those
strategies are becoming increasingly effective, forcing authorities into openness, fairness,
and transparency, though within the context of an authoritarian State overall. For an
illustration of this tension that demonstrates how mentioned “green emancipation” is at least
a two-decade-long tale, see Peter Ho, Greening without conflict? Environmentalism, NGOs
and Civil Society in China, 32 DEV. & CHANGE 893 (2002); see also Jude Howell et al.,
Accountability and legitimacy of NGOs under authoritarianism: The case of China, 41
THIRD WORLD Q. 113 (2020).
282. ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE THIRD REVOLUTION: XI JINPING AND THE NEW
CHINESE STATE 184 (Oxford University Press, 2018); Genia Kostka and Chunman Zhang,
Tightening the grip: Environmental governance under Xi Jinping, 27 ENVTL POLITICS 769,
772 (2018); contra Johann L. Thibaut, An Environmental Civil Society in China? Bridging
Theoretical Gaps through a Case Study of Environmental Protest, 42 INTERNATIONALES
ASIENFORUM 135 (2011).
`283.Yixian Sun, The Changing Role of China in Global Environmental Governance, 1
RISING POWERS Q. 43, 48 (2016).
284. One of the issues for the Party at the central level is that China’s Environmental
Protection Bureaus which are supposed to monitor environmental compliance on the ground
at the local level are administered by officials who are appointed and funded by the
provincial delegates of the Party itself, so that mutual protectionism to “look clean” before
the higher ranks is still widespread, despite attempts at reforming this system and breaking
this vicious circle by emphasising efficiency instead. Jessica Scott, From Environmental
Rights to Environmental Rule of Law: A Proposal for Better Environmental Outcomes, 6
MICH. J. OF ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 203, 226 (2016); see also Benjamin van Rooij et al., The
Authoritarian Logic of Regulatory Pluralism: Understanding China’s New Environmental
Actors, 10 REG. & GOVERNANCE 3 (2014).
285. See Hui Huang, Piercing the Corporate Veil in China: Where Is It Now and
Where Is It Heading?, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 743 (2012).
286. See, e.g., Daniel Esty, Red Lights to Green Lights: From 20th Century
Environmental Regulation to 21st Century Sustainability, 47 ENVTL. L. 1, 55 (2017).
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governmental apparatuses.287
“The growing dominance of [s]tate
ownership (especially in China, India, Iran, Mexico, Russia, and Saudi
Arabia) reduces the mitigation potential of investor-led disclosure,”288 thus
jeopardising liability. As Chinese scholars (affiliated to the leading Peking
University in Beijing) themselves strongly word,289 key state-owned
enterprises are still de facto unaccountable in China, regardless of any state
law, provincial regulation, or declaration to the opposite sense at any level
of the Executive or the courts. State ownership of companies is further
problematic at the international level, where such enterprises “might
challenge the exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of the act of [S]tate
doctrine, or comity of nations,”290 also before arbitration tribunals;291 in this
sense, China might have more to lose compared to Western market-driven,
private-competition-based economies if an international legal lifting of
such defences were to be agreed upon globally.
Around the world, beyond criminal charges292 and administrative
penalties, civil-liability regimes may provide for numerous financial and
non-financial tools, stemming from the assessment of, among others:
specific damages; replacement costs; punitive damages; legally defined
damages; legal costs; interests’ adjustments; and non-monetary
restitution.293 Nonetheless, China implements a voluntary-first approach to

287. See, e.g., HENRICK BERGSAGER & ANNA KORPPOO, CHINA’S STATE-OWNED
ENTERPRISES AS CLIMATE POLICY ACTORS: THE POWER AND STEEL SECTORS 59 (NORDIC
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 2013), https://perma.cc/B8UJ-HW6A.
288. Maria L. Banda, The bottom-up alternative: The mitigation potential of private
climate governance after the Paris Agreement, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 361 (2018).
289. See, e.g., Jin Wang et al., Reflections from the transboundary pollution of
Songhua River, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY: LEGAL REMEDIES
FOR TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION 273, 289 (Michael G. Faure & Song Ying eds., 2008).
290. Meinhard Doelle & Sara Seck, Loss & Damage from Climate Change: From
Concept to Remedy?, 20 CLIMATE POL’Y 669, 675 (2020) (emphasis added).
291. Refer to all pertinent examples reported in Michael Feit, Responsibility of the
State Under International Law for the Breach of Contract Committed by a State-Owned
Entity, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 142, 157 (2010).
292. For a pertinent summary about China’s environmental criminal legislation, see
Thomas Richter, Transboundary Environmental Crimes: An Analysis of Chinese and
European Law, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY: LEGAL REMEDIES
FOR TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION 253, 263–65 (Michael G. Faure & Song Ying eds., 2008);
see also He & Cliquet, supra note 205, at 160; Alexander Nikolaevich Shytov,
Environmental Crime and Communication to the Public in China, 22 J. CHINESE POL. SCI.
57, 57–75 (2017).
293. ANDREW FARMER, HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND
ENFORCEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 137–38 (2007).
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non-compliance,294 whereby not to lose their “face,”295 top managers
disclose sensitive business information to the enforcement authorities and
gradually progress towards compliance rather than being sanctioned openly
and straightaway.296 Although transposing domestic arrangements onto the
international level is always argumentatively risky, this closely resembles
the patterns which have increasingly crystallised in multilateral
environmental instruments, where hard responsibility (standard in
international law generally) is replaced by soft responsibility in terms of
expectations to compliance, enforced through soft mechanisms and (at
times) supported by private liability schemes.297 This is apparently a
contradiction as, theoretically, China would be supposed to endorse a
traditional sense of state-centred and sovereignty-rooted responsibility with
little purchase into “the contemporary international law of co-ordination
that follows the private law paradigm[, thus] not only based on sovereign
equality but also on democracy[, solicitations from the private sector,] and
human rights.”298
VI. China, internationally
VI.1 China and the ongoing talks on international liability
Intervening at the debates being hosted by the United Nations (“UN”),
Mr Jia Guide—current Director-General of the Department of Treaty and
Law of the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and representative of China
at the 19th Meeting of the 6th Committee during the UNGA’s 58th Session
on 30 October 2003,299 believed
conditions were in place for the International Law
Commission to pursue an in-depth study on international liability.
The Commission should carry out more studies on domestic and
international practices on the topic, to find common denominators
that would solidly lay the groundwork for a uniform regime. The
294. But only in this field: in several others, e.g., cybersecurity, companies are
compelled to disclose incompliance also publicly on penalty of huge fines.
295. On the concept of “face” in Chinese sociology and management, see e.g., Peter
C. King & Wei Zhang, The Role of Face in a Chinese Context of Trust and Trust Building,
18 INT’L J. CROSS CULTURAL MGMT. 149, 149–73 (2018); Qi Xiaoying, Reconstructing the
Concept of Face in Cultural Sociology: In Goffman’s Footsteps, Following the Chinese
Case, 4 J. CHINESE SOC. 1, 1–17 (2017).
296. FARMER, supra note 293, at 146, 155.
297. Maljean-Dubois, supra note 108, at 39–41.
298. Armin von Bogdandy et al., From Public International to International Public
Law: Translating World Public Opinion into International Public Authority, 28 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 115, 119 (2017).
299. U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., 19th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/58/SR.19 (Oct. 31, 2003).
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proposed allocation-of-loss regime should combine principles
with flexibility. China endorsed, in principle, the various proposals
of the special rapporteur on the scope of the topic and
compensation for damage to the environment, among others. He
said the proposals should be fleshed out and adjusted on the basis
of further survey of State practice.300
The problem with this statement is that the only way to collect state
practice emanating from new doctrine or phenomena is by waiting a
significant amount of time, which may vary depending on the field. In
opposition to Italy, The Netherlands, and other countries, China had
previously—and successfully—argued for limiting ILC drafts to
transboundary harm on other sovereign territories only, rather than on the
commons as well.301 In IEL, this helps indeed distinguishing between the
transboundary-harm regime and the climate-change one, although this is
not the same as to say that these two issues should in fact be kept separate
(especially for the purpose of safeguarding cultural heritage).
VI.2 A “developing” China vis-à-vis climate change regimes
Extra-responsibility liability is an essential aspect to scrutinise
because it addresses a wider spectrum of state actions compared to
complementary (i.e. responsibility-dependent) liability, but also because
individual responsibilities of States are, in this field, factually nonactionable.
[T]here is the idea to attribute climate change-related damage
to a State based on its historical emissions or to the degree in
which it fulfils its reduction targets contained in the KyotoProtocol. [. . .] However, [if] the attribution of responsibility for
damages is linked to the reduction targets that States willingly
consent to, then there is considerably less incentive to commit to
such obligations[,]302

300. Press Release, 6th Comm. Gen. Assem., Harmful Effects of Transboundary
Pollution Cited as Key to Proposed Law to Govern International Liability, U.N. Press
Release GA/L/3241 (Oct. 30, 2003), https://perma.cc/S6ML-ADFU (emphasis added).
301. See Official Records of the UN General Assembly, Fifty-third Session, Sixth
Committee, 14th meeting (A/C.6/53/SR.14), p. 6, ¶ 40.
302. Franziska Knur, The United Nations Human Rights-Based Approach to Climate
Change – Introducing a Human Dimension to International Climate Law, CLIMATE CHANGE
AS A THREAT TO PEACE: IMPACTS ON CULTURAL HERITAGE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 37, 48
(Sabine von Schorlemer & Sylvia Maus eds., 2014).
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and this adds to the already reluctant approach shown by most major
emitters; to start with, this would surely turn off China’s most recent
enthusiasm for the codification of emission control regimes. The rationalist
cost-benefit calculation goes that “[t]he greater the benefits a [S]tate can
gain from defection, the greater the necessity for deterrence in the form of
a threat of punishment. This means the more that [S]tates are required to
change their behaviour and the greater the incentive to free ride, the greater
the need for enforcement, incentives and disincentives as
counterbalances.”303 The question remains however to what extent, to
punish a country’s firm, that country should be punished for not preventing
or regulating enough its company’s pollution; indeed, punishing a country
equates to shifting the burden to its citizens, most of whom might have
nothing to do with said company’s operations, nor market.
Before Russia was expelled from the G8, the latter frequently met in
its 8+5 configuration including not only the eight world-top industrialised
countries, but also the Group of Five (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and
South Africa – not to be confused with the BRICS), and in this wider
configuration it tried to impact climate change policies at the global level.304
Contrariwise,
the G20 combines—as institutional equals in a single
forum—the world’s two leading climate polluters, China and the
United States, and the world’s major powers and polluters that
cause and can thus control climate change. The first eight G20
summits from 2008 to 2013 dealt increasingly with climate change
and started to shift the leadership of the world’s evolving climate
change control regime from the prevailing UN-led, divided,
development-first one to a new, inclusive, equal, environmentfirst one. But as its ninth summit in 2014 dramatically revealed,
the G20 faced severe internal divisions and remained unable to
meet the challenge by creating a full control regime that worked,
either outside or inside the UN.305
The G7 Summits held in Paris and Houston in 1989 and 1990
respectively addressed environmental concerns extensively, but China—
invited to participate—could not exercise notable influence on the
discussion as the diplomatic circles were shocked at the Tiananmen

303. JÜRGEN FRIEDRICH, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL “SOFT LAW”: THE
FUNCTIONS AND LIMITS OF NONBINDING INSTRUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE AND LAW 328 (2013).
304. JOHN JAMES KIRTON & ELLA KOKOTSIS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF CLIMATE
CHANGE: G7, G20, AND UN LEADERSHIP 182–84 (2015).
305. KIRTON & KOKOTSIS, supra note 304, at 9–10.
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Square’s massacre of unarmed student protesters.306 However, the
international community could not afford to leave China behind, as in 2005
it “surpassed the U.S. as the leading emitter of greenhouse gas in the world
. . . Brazil had surpassed Russia the year before. India had surpassed Japan
in 1995. It was clear that climate change could not be controlled unless the
Rio-Kyoto regime was replaced with one where all major carbon polluters
were obliged to control their carbon.”307 The 2007 G7 Summit organised
in Heiligendamm pledged to institutionalise mentioned 8+5 configuration
with regards to the climate change dossier, and partly succeeded in
overcoming the dichotomy between Global North and Global South, by
convincing China and India308 to join the industrialised world’s efforts as
major emitters. “Now all countries, including “major emitters,” would act
together, with the North going furthest and fastest and still transferring
resources to the South, and the South constraining its carbon as its
responsibility and capacity allowed.”309 At the 2009 Pittsburgh Summit,
China vetoed a funding scheme for climate change initiatives, although an
agreement was reached about withdrawing fossil-fuel subsidies: “the G20
successfully reached out to put a[n] inclusive, expanded, innovative regime
in place. But it did not revive the failing old UN regime at its next COP,
taking place in Copenhagen [ten] weeks later,”310 where China vetoed thirdparty verification on the actual implementation status of any binding
commitment.
This whole digression on the G7/G8/G20 was instrumental for
illustrating the following paradox: China was “doing more domestically
than [it was] prepared to agree to internationally;”311 it vetoed both the
funding scheme and the verification mechanism. Back then, the popular
President Obama was attracting praise worldwide, therefore China could
only emerge meaningfully by opposition;312 conversely, the Trump era has
been characterised by massive U.S. retreat from leadership in

306. KIRTON & KOKOTSIS, supra note 304, at 81–93.
307. Id. at 189.
308. Yet, the United Nations University warns that “[e]ven in the event that a few
countries like China and India are able to make the leap forward as fast-developing
countries, the rest of the developing countries will still continue to face serious challenges
in the international negotiating arena” – Joyeeta Gupta, Increasing Disenfranchisement of
Developing Country Negotiators in a Multi-Speed World, THE POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION
IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOVERNANCE 21, 35 (Jessica F. Green & W. Bradnee
Chambers eds., 2006) (emphasis added).
309. KIRTON & KOKOTSIS, supra note 304, at 202.
310. Id. at 230.
311. Id. at 250.
312. Indeed, during the Paris Agreement negotiations under Obama’s second
presidential term, China appeared “largely unwilling to take a leadership role before the
US.” Luke Kemp, US-proofing the Paris Climate Agreement, 17(1) CLIMATE POL’Y 86, 97
(2017).
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multilateralism,313 which made it easier for Beijing to “fill the void” and
gain prominence by proposing itself as a constructive and world-ordersupporting forthcoming superpower.314 The authenticity and genuineness
of Chinese commitments can be questioned on the ground that they depend
on Washington’s foreign policy more than on policy stances they
consistently attempt to uphold before multilateral fora: whenever
politically convenient, the “propaganda-shaped” national interests of
distinguishing themselves from the current superpower trump the
substantive ones inherent in global environmental discourses. Nonetheless,
it is fair to note that China’s “environmentalist turn” was inaugurated and
gradually yet systematically pursued by President Xi during the last two
years of Obama’s second presidential term, which helped converging
American and Chinese stances in Paris after the diplomatic blow in
Copenhagen. At any rate, by signing the 2014 China-Korea and ChinaSwitzerland Free Trade Agreements, China committed to high levels of
environmental protection and not to curb the existing national
environmental legislation. This exemplifies what has been termed as the
“support network” shaping binary negotiations.315 The Chinese turn from
Copenhagen to Paris was commended internationally316 and functioned
well as an identity reinforcer for the Party, too, both domestically in terms
of symbolic legitimacy credited to the pursuance of a state-planned green
economy,317 and externally, where China was eventually “hailed . . . as a
global leader on climate change.”318 However, it shall be emphasised that
the Paris Agreement does not provide for any enforceable liability regime,
neither as a corollary of state responsibility for a breach of said stipulation,

313. Yet, this is a long-standing issue in US foreign policy, especially vis-à-vis
public international law; for an introductive explanation of the American international legal
isolationism, see, e.g., David D. Caron, Between Empire and Community – The United
States and Multilateralism 2001-2003: A Mid-Term Assessment, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
395 (2003).
314. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Trump Administration and International Law, 56
WASHBURN L. J. 413, 437 (2017). See also Adam J. Tooze, Did Xi Just Save the World?,
FOREIGN POLICY (Sept. 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/77GL-V3RF (trying to make sense of
China’s pledge at the UN to be carbon-free by 2060). Furthermore, “the fact that
environmental stewardship is not a liberal norm, but one arising from shared fates, offers
[China] the opportunity to offset some of the damage to its image done by its rejection of
democracy and liberal human rights.” Robert Falkner & Barry Gordon Buzan, The
Emergence of Environmental Stewardship as a Primary Institution of Global International
Society, 25(1) EUR. J. INT’L REL. 131, 146 (2019).
315. DEBBIE DE GIROLAMO, THE FUGITIVE IDENTITY OF MEDIATION: NEGOTIATIONS,
SHIFT CHANGES AND ALLUSIONARY ACTION 13 (2013).
316. Anthony H. F. Li, Hopes of Limiting Global Warming? China and the Paris
Agreement on Climate Change, 1 CHINA PERSPECTIVES 49, 50 (2016).
317. Alex L. Wang, Symbolic Legitimacy and Chinese Environmental Reform, 48
ENVTL. L. 699, 757–58 (2018).
318. Id. at 755.
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nor as a responsibility-independent compensatory scheme for climate
change-related damages which do not represent a violation of this
“framework agreement” under public international law.319
In addition, differential treatments remain dangerous stipulations
beneficiary States try to take advantage of.320 For instance, exemptions
based on developmental status might impair the negotiating machine up to
rendering a global environmental regime ineffective, as occurred in the case
of the Kyoto Protocol when the US Senate unanimously rejected its
ratification on the basis that countries like China and India were “unfairly”
not demanded to comply with the same rules.321 On their part, the IndoChinese alliance rebutted that its contemporary polluting flow matters
relatively little compared to the polluting stock cumulated by industrial
power over the last three centuries.322 One possible solution was to provide
“compensation to developing countries for the costs that would promote
using the most efficient energy technologies. Another suggestion [wa]s for
advanced countries to acquire emission rights issued by developing
countries. A third proposal [was to implement] a common tax framework
with cross-border transfers.”323 Accounting for the fact that long-standing
polluters like the US or the UK could not foresee the environmental effects
of their industrial development till relatively recently, someone suggested
the application of a sort of “faultless liability” scheme according to which
such countries would not be held declaratively responsible for said
pollution, while still being liable to compensate (at least in the form of
higher standards to be upheld in present times) for the damage caused to
the planet over the last three centuries.324 Other scholars rebutted that there
is no reason to make those countries pay if they are not considered
responsible, as the two things shall come together;325 this notwithstanding,
mentioned rebutting scholars fail to appreciate two elements: that liability
319. Maryam al-Dabbagh, Towards a Middle Path: Loss & Damage in the 2015
Paris Agreement, N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. (2016), https://perma.cc/DN5Y-QCGD; see also
Robert Falkner, The Paris Agreement and the New Logic of International Climate Politics,
92 INT’L AFF. 1107, 1117 (2016).
320. ELLI LOUKA, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: FAIRNESS,
EFFECTIVENESS, AND WORLD ORDER 110–11 (2006).
321. LAVANYA RAJAMANI, DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 12 (2012). President Bush himself played a resolutive role towards
this rejection. See generally Greg Kahn, The Fate of the Kyoto Protocol Under the Bush
Administration, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 548 (2003).
322. CARLOS M. PELÁEZ & CARLOS A. PELÁEZ, GLOBALIZATION AND THE STATE:
TRADE AGREEMENTS, INEQUALITY, THE ENVIRONMENT, FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND VULNERABILITIES VOLUME II 62 (2008).
323. Id. at 63.
324. See, e.g., Henry Shue, Global Environment and International Inequality, 75
INT’L AFF. 531, 535–36 (1999).
325. See, e.g., Simon Caney, Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global
Climate Change, 18 L.J.I.L. 747, 762 (2005).
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without responsibility is a useful legal device to address a factual situation
without losing oneself in endless doctrinal debates on whose fault it is from
an abstractly doctrinal standpoint; and that the bona fide ignorance of such
countries is highly debatable, given the obviousness of those effects on the
ecosystem even before non-expert eyes. Beyond this specific dispute, no
doubt exists that legal devices like liability need a rethinking as to converge
towards the needs of the Anthropocene, “likely to force a re-evaluation of
the legal irrelevance of small scale individual actions” that, through big
numbers, escalate their effects rapidly and call for an equally ready legal
response before things precipitate irreversibly.326
The interesting fact is that China would face today several criticism
when relying on its supposedly “developing” status, which has already been
questioned by several industrialised States327 as well as by the World Bank
and the WTO among other bodies.328 When negotiating the global climate
change regime, developed countries decided to disapply the concept of
“common heritage of mankind”329 with reference to the atmosphere, as “to
steer away from policies that might encourage distributional and
collectivistic approaches to global resource management;”330 those same
collectivistic approaches do, in theory, subsume the ideological
foundations of the Chinese state, population, and ruling class (“socialism
with Chinese characteristics;” “socialist market economy”). Consequently,
one would expect China to uphold such vision of the world society in all
circumstances, including its potential “upgrading” to developed-country
status and possible overtaking of the US as the only superpower. The
Director of Leiden University’s Grotius Centre for International Legal
Studies speaks about the commons as being treated like “common sink” by
world’s great powers,331 and despite the brutal expression, he might not
stand too far from the truth; a few hopes do still hold, however, with regards

326. Eric Biber, Law in the Anthropocene Epoch, 106 GEO. L.J. 1, 42–45 (2017).
327. Clara Weinhardt & Tobias T. Brink, Varieties of Contestation: China’s Rise
and the Liberal Trade Order, 27 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 258, 268 (2020).
328. On the untenability of this dichotomy, see Rostam Josef Neuwirth, A
Constitutional Tribute to Global Governance: Overcoming the Chimera of the DevelopingDeveloped Country Dichotomy, 2010/20 EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE [EUI] WORKING
PAPERS (2010) (It.); see also Rostam Josef Neuwirth, Global Law and Sustainable
Development: Change and the “Developing-Developed Country” Terminology, 29 EUR. J.
DEV. RES. 911 (2017); Rostam Josef Neuwirth, “BRICS Law”: An Oxymoron, or from
Cooperation, via Consolidation, to Codification, 6 BRICS L.J. 6, 14 n. 49 (2019).
329. First introduced in the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
in the Event of Armed Conflict.
330. OKEREKE, CHUKWUMERIJE GLOBAL JUSTICE AND NEOLIBERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE: ETHICS, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 137
(2008) (emphasis added).
331. Nicolaas Schrijver, Managing the Global Commons: Common Good or
Common Sink?, 37(7), THIRD WORLD Q. 1252–1267 (2016).
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to a different approach to “global superpowering” by countries like China,
at least from an environmental perspective. Whilst China has already
challenged the lex lata by acting or at least arguing de lege ferenda as a
norm entrepreneur but in an exploitative fashion in other fields broadly
considered as “commons”—such as outer space security and maritime
delimitations, especially with regards to its Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ)332—Beijing seems placed more promisingly with regards to the
atmosphere and Earth’s environmental resources. One last element to be
mentioned here concerns China’s participation in multilateral efforts to
deploy space satellite technology as to measure the concentration of toxic
emissions and make States answerable under IEL;333 whether this would
prove auxiliary to cultural-heritage preservation, too, remains to be seen,
not only in terms of identifying polluting activities insisting on heritage
locations, but more specifically as far as international legal mechanisms are
concerned, that is, in retailoring liability schemes.
VI.3 China’s sovereignty and transboundary environmental damage
Upholding the generally recognised principle that international duties
of non-intervention prevent any sort of interference with the political,
socioeconomic and cultural life of other States,334 the damage to cultural
heritage through transboundary pollution might be reinterpreted as undue
interference in the sovereignty of third countries. The same interference is
produced when global phenomena are at play.
In keeping with its orthodox international affairs’ rhetoric, China
qualifies its subscription to—or endorsement of—international
environmental instruments by stressing the term sovereignty;335 as the latter
can be argued from any side, this is a double-edged game to play.336 For
example, a stress on “sovereignty” in climate change law may equally
underpin polluting countries (whose sovereignty should not be infringed
upon with restraints, limitations, blames, sanctions, investigations, and so
332. Carla Park Freeman, An Uncommon Approach to the Global Commons:
Interpreting China’s Divergent Positions on Maritime and Outer Space Governance, 241
CHINA Q., 1, 15–16 (2020), https://perma.cc/Y4R3-ZMJG.
333. See Timiebi Aganaba-Jeanty & Anna Huggins, Satellite Measurement of GHG
Emissions: Prospects for Enhancing Transparency and Answerability under International
Law, 8(2) TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 303, 314 (2019).
334. BRADLY J. CONDON, ENVIRONMENTAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE WTO: TRADE
SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 250–51 (2006).
335. See, e.g., Wang Yi Attends Global Pact for the Environment Summit MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFF. OF CHINA (Sept. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/492C-VZNL; Xiao Hong,
China Lauds UN Environment Pact, CHINA DAILY, https://perma.cc/AW99-GAL4 (last
updated Sept. 20, 2017).
336. LINDA HAJJAR LEIB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: PHILOSOPHICAL,
THEORETICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 127 (2011).
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forth) and polluted ones (whose sovereignty is violated any time they have
to bear the consequences of pollution produced elsewhere). Over time,
both meanings may turn out useful for a country to rely upon in different
sets of circumstances. Building on this observation, how may China better
project the environmentalist image of its contribution to climate
governance, whilst at the same time protecting its sovereignty-centred
narratives? The risk-allocation discourse provides an insightful model,
whereby China cannot admit fault for transnational pollution cases, nor can
it accept its own territory being polluted by third States, and the solution
lies in fault-free regimes where States do not officially accept liability yet
they allocate resources to common funds to be “automatically” employed
in the event of an environmental accident. Quite remarkably, the Chinese
delegation did not oppose the Global Pact for the Environment whose
Enabling Resolution was introduced by France at the UNGA in 2018;
whilst distancing itself from other countries’ claims that the Pact would
have constituted an unprecedented encroachment upon States’ sovereignty,
Beijing explicitly endorsed the French concerns and even “pardoned” the
inadequate consultation of the Group of 77+China’s chairperson.337 In
other words, China does not see any paradox in supporting international
liability schemes versus domestic ones, insofar as the former “combine a
duty of operators to provide financial security and guarantees for potential
compensation claims with subsidiary industry- and/or State-sponsored
funds;”338 these are the classical private international law modi operandi,339
as such what is missing or uncertain is the public dimension of the same
mechanisms (liability of States themselves, as well as individual noncriminal liability directly under international law, which would be quite
revolutionary a legal solution).
VII. Tentative conclusions
This article endeavoured to be one of the first-ever attempts to unpack
the way in which responsibility-independent340 IEL liability schemes might
be transposed into the protection of cultural heritage worldwide—yet
operating the necessary distinctions between the non-overlapping
rationales underpinning these two protecting regimes—and what benefits

337. Aguila, supra note 144, at 20–22.
338. Alexander Proelss, Polluter-Pays, A GLOBAL PACT FOR THE ENVIRONMENT:
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS 85, 92 (Yann Aguila & Jorge E. Viñuales eds., 2019)
339. See generally Guillaume Laganière, Liability for transboundary pollution in
private international law: A duty to ensure prompt and adequate compensation, Ph.D. thesis
22, 89, 119 (McGill University, 2020), https://perma.cc/TBT7-GAT6.
340. “Faultless,” “fault-free,” or “no-fault” in domestic-law jargon. See, e.g., JULIO
BARBOZA, THE ENVIRONMENT, RISK AND LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 103 n. 97
(2011).
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and hurdles that transposition would encode. Further study is needed to
determine how said transposition may find applicability in factual
scenarios; research building on this first theoretical attempt will need to
explore who is liable (and not necessarily responsible) for cultural heritage
damages under environmental law (or partly under such regime) when the
latter are caused by third state and non-state actors, at times jointly with
state and non-state actors of the primary State. Perhaps some model
applications of the Coase theorem to scenarios where environmental
liability schemes might serve to protect cultural heritage may help, too, as
other scholars have tried to accomplish in different fields of environmental
regulation.341 Three core issues are: what compensation is due; how the
quantum is determined; and what differences arise between “the commons”
and “ordinary” heritage. Nonetheless, all the preliminary considerations
above allow us to essay a couple of provisional conclusions. Our hope is
that they will serve as a springboard for new scholarship, less stuck in oldfashioned responsibility problems but rather projected towards concrete
resolutory alternatives.
Internationally, the current cultural heritage law regime appears
unequipped to face the contemporary challenges; an analysis of UNESCO
conventions and other relevant documents has shown that such regime is
unbalanced in favour of wartime damages to tangible heritage, thus failing
to thoroughly address peacetime damages, destruction of intangible
legacies, and attacks against sites where nature and heritage conflate
unmissably. IEL is not fully equipped either, and yet, despite most liability
schemes resolving in political decisions, if one of the two regimes is to be
updated, the environmental one is perhaps more advisable an option in
terms of doctrines, legal tools, and trends.342 On top of that, a fund-based,
compensation-without-fault approach is well received also by those who
maintain a property-centred approach to heritage and the environment; in
fact, “[w]hile continuing to oppose global regulatory schemes, which may
pose their own threats to property rights and individual liberty, [Free
Market Environmentalism] adherents should consider the viability of
various international compensation or indemnification mechanisms.”343
As for China, it generally champions the concept of faultless liability,
that is, a type of liability which does not depend on the defendant being
subjectively responsible for the act under scrutiny. The relevant assessment
is not “whether the damage that occurred represented the materialisation of

341. See, e.g., Tamar Meshel & Moin A. Yahya, International Water Law and Fresh
Water Dispute Resolution: A Coasean Perspective, 92(2) UNIV. OF COLO. L. REV. (2021).
342. E.g., by integrating specific cultural-heritage clauses within the liability section
of environmental agreements.
343. Jonathan H. Adler, Taking Property Rights Seriously: The Case of Climate
Change, 26(2) SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, 296, 316 (2009).
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one of the risks that made the defendant’s conduct negligent,”344 but merely
whether causation exists between the damage and the defendant’s
(in)actions. When it comes to transboundary damage, China sympathises
with the introduction of hybrid multilateral public-private liability schemes
(provided they do not result in naming-and-shaming attitudes against the
PRC) whilst retracting from establishing its own domestically (grounded in
extraterritoriality), which also precludes bilateral recognition.345 To the
contrary, as far as climate change is concerned, Beijing privileges domestic
targets346 but remains wary of—or at least, lukewarm about—binding
liability solutions internationally (unless they come in the model of the
Multilateral Fund attached to the Montreal Protocol, examined supra).
This bifurcation proves highly problematic for the sake of our
discussion, as protecting heritage through IEL means relying on state
liability schemes addressing both issues, whose effects are often integrated
and escalate each other. After all, why should a “developing” country like
China contribute to multilateral funds, beyond reputational gains? For
example, accepting the need for such contribution is easier when
considering heritage of universal value through the prism of the commons,
in such a way that wherever they are located, and the loftier the ambitions
of China as a potential superpower, the more such outstandingly valuable
heritage is somehow “Chinese” as well (although, as we have already
discussed, sorting “universal” heritage from “ordinary” one is controversial
an exercise). Also, those funds could be designed differently from others
where all participants or potential beneficiaries are required to regularly
(preventively) contribute regardless of contingent necessity: a need-based

344. Donal Nolan, Deconstructing the Duty of Care, 129 L. Q. REV. 559, 575 (2013).
345. “With the exception of the treaties the countries participate in for civil liability,
China, Korea and Japan have largely remained outside of the transnationalization of
environmental law, specifically, and even civil law, generally. Overall, there is lower
“interoperability” of national court systems in Northeast Asia [compared to North America].
Even in commercial disputes, Asian plaintiffs generally do not participate in the grand
American tradition of forum shopping. Strict reciprocity is still required for the recognition
of foreign judgments in the three countries, discouraging foreign plaintiffs’ recourse to
justice in the region. [. . .] In Northeast Asia, [. . . s]tate practice has consistently emphasized
diplomatic channels to address transnational concerns, particularly in the field of
transboundary pollution.” Laura S. Henry et al., From Smelter Fumes to Silk Road Winds:
Exploring Legal Responses to Transboundary Air Pollution over South Korea, 11(3) WASH.
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV., 565, 607 (2012).
346. See also Deng Haifeng [邓海峰], China, CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY:
TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 112, 125–135 (Richard Lord et al. eds., 2012). It shall
be emphasised that these are indeed targets: “there is still relatively little political appetite
in China to pass a climate change law, and [. . .] any climate litigation that emerges is likely
to take a more peripheral route, for example, by focusing on issues of air pollution,” which
are a purely domestic matter displaying a domestic plaintiff versus a domestic defendant
arguing domestic incidents. See Jacqueline Peel & Jolene Lin, Transnational Climate
Litigation: The Contribution of the Global South, 113(4) AM. J. INT’L L. 679, 693 (2019).
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arrangement might be thought of instead, where money and other forms of
assistance are provided on occasion by selected participants, according to
quotas previously negotiated – this solution, however, would be slightly
more time-consuming in the event of an actual disaster, as the money could
not be dispensed automatically.
Needless to say, the present analysis has focused on fairly numerous
but still selected segments of China’s posture in international law and
international relations, whilst many more elements warrant to be dissected
and analysed.347 For this reason, we call for further research on this topic,
aimed at validating or disproving the aforementioned claims by means of
alternative doctrinal standpoints, possibly with the auxilium of empirical
datasets, and in light of the never-obvious trajectory of the PRC in its
endeavour to appoint itself as a (responsible?) shaper of the global legal
order. It might catch us all by surprise!

347. For example, the liability of China for environmental degradation resulting from
Belt and Road Initiative (“BRI”) infrastructure projects impacting cultural heritage would
be worth exploring: some UNESCO-listed sites (like “Silk Roads: the Routes Network of
Chang’an-Tianshan Corridor”) belong indeed to the same BRI concept. See, Jingkui Jiang,
Silk Road Cultures and the Silk Road Economic Belt, CHINA’S GLOBAL REBALANCING AND
THE NEW SILK ROAD 15 (B. R. Deepak [狄伯杰] ed., 2018); see also Tang Xiaoyang, Coevolutionary Pragmatism: Re-examine “China Model” and Its Impact on Developing
Countries, 29(126) J. OF CONTEMP. CHINA 853, 867–868 (2020); Marina Lostal &,
Guilherme Vasconcelos Vilaça, The Bamiyazation of Cultural Heritage and the Silk Road
Economic Belt: Challenges and Opportunities for China, 3(2) CHINESE J. OF COMP. L. 329
(2015). Interestingly, “Beijing has in the past made promises to ‘green’ the One Belt One
Road. But in his historic address to the U.N. General Assembly, Xi made no mention of
China’s foreign projects. [. . .] A green One Belt One Road would be an even more dramatic
proposition that the original coal-based version.” Adam J. Tooze, Welcome to the Final
Battle for the Climate, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/2MF3-ZFCH.
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